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FROM THE EDITORS 
Mark Sheldon 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, SHELDON@NORTHWESTERN.EDU 
Mary Rorty 
STANFORD UNIVERSITY, MVR2J@STANFORD.EDU 
Welcome to the spring 2015 edition of the APA Newsletter 
on Philosophy and Medicine. This volume of the newsletter 
contains some very thoughtful pieces on topics that 
have been with us for a number of years—enhancement, 
allocation of resources, the patient’s will, how to think 
about disability, and care ethics. But each author makes 
clear how complicated the issues are and how much more 
attention and discussion is required in relation to these 
topics. 
The first paper, “The Weight of the ‘Will’ of Competent 
and Incompetent Persons” by Jennifer Blumenthal Barby, 
focuses on a problem that has been with us from the 
beginning of the modern period of medical ethics. What 
weight should be placed on the will of competent and 
incompetent persons? She takes as her focus a recent 
paper by Daniel Groll and in her analysis advances the idea 
that the will is not “structurally decisive,” as Groll argues, 
but more appropriately “substantially weighty.” She points 
to the importance of ascertaining the status of the will, and 
thinking further about “the person’s well-being.” 
In the second paper, “Moral Relevance in the Concepts 
and Language of Human Synthetic Moral Enhancement,” 
Christian Carrozzo takes up a topic that also has concerned 
us for a long time, and that is “enhancement.” But rather 
than focus on the issue of enhancement in relation to the 
question of justice in access, he focuses instead on the 
issue of “synthetically enhancing human morality,” and 
here he takes on recent work in neuroscience, raising very 
fundamental questions about that work. 
Further focus on enhancement occurred at the Central 
Division meeting in St. Louis on February 21, 2015. Fabrice 
Jotterand moderated a panel with contributions from 
Veljiko Dubljevic, Nicole A. Vincent, and Jeffrey P. Bishop. 
The panelists address the meaning of moral enhancement, 
current developments in neuroscience in relation to moral 
enhancement, and a description of philosophical and 
ethical questions posed by moral enhancement. 
With Michael Boylan’s paper, we move from enhancement 
to disability. In “Thinking about Disability via Agency and 
Human Rights,” Boylan aims to re-think the “conceptual 
paradigm regarding disability.” Two particular ideas he 
advances are the “Disability Fallacy,” where we mistakenly 
identify a localized disability with the whole person. The 
other problem is if we inappropriately think about “fault” 
in relation to a person’s disability. Avoiding both of these 
mistakes, he argues, we should begin to move in a direction 
where, in relation to the disabled, we eliminate negative 
liberty and enhance positive liberty. 
Felicia Nimue Ackerman’s wonderful poem, “You Are Old, 
Father William (with apologies to Lewis Carroll),” seems 
like the perfect poem to read before diving into the next 
section on care ethics. 
“Care Ethics and Pragmatism: Care as Pragmatic Meliorism,” 
by Justin Bell, and “Care Ethics and Pragmatism: 
Cultivating Empathy with Nonhuman Others through Moral 
Imagination,” by Tess Varner, do at least two things. The 
first is that, making use of John Dewey’s ethics, they 
thoughtfully develop care ethics in a way that permits more 
explicit or concrete engagement with persons. Second, 
they make clear a way in which the personal also becomes 
political, specifically political as in democracy. Varner sees 
“caring that can be implemented in communities and 
institutions,” as well as beyond, to nonhumans. 
In the final paper, “Rationing in the ICU, First-Come, First-
Served?,” Leonard Fleck considers propositions put forward 
by the Bioethics Task Force of the American Thoracic Society 
that should serve as a basis for allocating space in the ICU. 
Fleck focuses on proposition number six, which endorses 
the principle of first-come, first-served. Through a series of 
examples, he raises serious questions about what weight 
this proposition should actually have. 
The last word from the editors. We are always looking for 
book reviews for the newsletter, works in progress, stories, 
and poems. Please send them to us, and feel free as well
to comment on any of the papers that appear here. We will 
publish them in the next issue. Even though the newsletter 
only appears twice a year, we are always happy to include 
a sustained focus on a topic that might not otherwise get 
the attention that it needs. 
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FROM THE CHAIR 
Different Notions of Equality in Political 
Philosophy and in Public Health 
Nir Eyal 
HARVARD UNIVERSITY 
Should we be bothered by the following variance? In 
political philosophy and in economics, unfair inequality 
is usually assessed between individuals. You have more 
than I do (through no fault of my own), and that’s unfair. 
By contrast, in public health and in sociology, unfair 
inequality is most often assessed between groups. More 
is concentrated among people of your class or race than 
among people of mine, and that’s unfair. 
If you’re an egalitarian, should you change political 
philosophy, to bring it in line with public health scholarship 
and practice? Or should you change the latter, to reconcile 
it with political philosophy? 
Public health experts often explain that not every inequality 
between individuals is an “inequity” (as they put it). Only 
inequality between groups marked out by consistent 
disadvantage, such as many different races and classes, 
is unfair. Only such inequality stems from partiality, 
discrimination, and oppression. Only it correlates with 
certain inequality-related population health problems. 
It alone is actionable. They contrast this with inequality 
between individuals, for example, in longevity. The 
latter, they argue, is natural, inevitable, less important, or 
otherwise less informative—not unjust. 
Egalitarian public health experts can mobilize powerful 
examples in support of their position. Intuitively, there 
is something undeniably unjust about the higher risk of 
an African-American child dying in any given period, in 
comparison with that of a white American child: roughly, 
1.5 times higher. That intuitive injustice may initially seem 
easy for luck egalitarian political philosophers to explain: 
because children should not be held culpable for any 
choices, and because dying is disproportionate to even the 
most culpable acts, it is particularly clear that this inequality 
is not justified by the disadvantaged party’s own choice or 
fault. 
However, who is the disadvantaged party here? Not 
any particular African-American child, at least not in any 
straightforward way, because most do not die. Should we 
say, then, that one race is worse off than another through 
no fault or choice of its own—and that injustice inheres in 
that? Should we say that interracial gaps are sufficient for 
inequality of status, and that the injustice inheres in that? 
What should luck egalitarians, democratic egalitarians, and 
other egalitarian philosophers make of this challenge? 
My own position is that the public health experts’ approach 
is often useful, but remains entirely compatible with 
fundamental concern for equality between individuals. 
The political philosophy tradition is philosophically correct. 
Defending that position, however, is a task that I shall leave 
for another day. 
ARTICLES 
The Weight of the “Will” of Competent 
and Incompetent Persons 
Jennifer Blumenthal Barby 
BAYLOR COLLEGE OF MEDICINE 
In a recent Ethics article, Daniel Groll takes on the important 
project of examining, clarifying, and re-conceptualizing 
the roles that the wills of competent and incompetent 
people should play in third-party deliberations about 
their welfare.1 Groll’s argument has two major points: (1) 
we can fail to respect a competent person’s will even if 
we are acting in accordance with it/not overriding it (i.e., 
we can fail to treat his will as “structurally decisive”), and 
(2) there are ways in which an incompetent person’s will 
should play a role in third-party decisions about how to act 
towards him despite the fact that he is incompetent (i.e., 
his will should be “substantially relevant”). In this paper, 
I argue against Groll’s claim that respecting a competent 
person’s will requires treating it as structurally decisive. In 
fact, I argue that treating the will as structurally decisive 
as Groll describes it actually disrespects a person’s will. 
I will also argue that Groll’s argument about the role that 
incompetent persons’ wills should play faces a dilemma: 
either he takes a position that is underdeveloped and 
sufficiently vague to offer little to no practical normative 
guidance, or he takes a position that is not at all new and 
affords the will itself a very small role, contrary to his claim 
to give it a substantially relevant role. 
Before beginning, it is worth briefly explaining Groll’s 
motivation. Groll is motivated by two things: first, by 
what he perceives to be an unclarity about what role 
an incompetent person’s will should play, since some 
clinicians and scholars think that “his current wishes count 
for nothing,” and others think that “respecting the patient’s 
will (or respecting his autonomy, as it is sometimes put) is 
still centrally important in deciding what to do, even though 
proponents of this idea admitted that the patient was 
incompetent.”2 Second, he is motivated by an opposition to 
the predominant view that the only way we can disrespect 
a competent person’s will is by acting contrary to it (e.g., 
overriding someone’s choice or action, or forcing him to 
act or forbear).3 Groll believes that there are other morally 
important ways that we can fail to respect a competent 
person’s will even if we follow it; namely, we can fail to 
treat it as [structurally] decisive.4 
TREATING COMPETENT PERSONS’ WILLS AS
“STRUCTURALLY DECISIVE” 
According to Groll, failure to respect a person’s will occurs 
when we behave in a way towards that person in part
because the person wills it, and in part because there is 
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more good to be produced from following the person’s 
will than from overriding it. The example that Groll gives 
is a physician who accepts his [competent] patient, Bob’s, 
wish to refuse a PEG tube, but who does so in part because 
the refusal is the patient’s wish and in part because she 
thinks that overriding the patient’s wish and placing a PEG 
tube against his will would do more harm than good. In 
order to have respected the patient’s will, Groll argues, the 
physician should have accepted the PEG tube refusal just 
because the patient willed it.5 To consider whether or not 
the PEG tube, even if inserted against the patient’s will, 
would do more harm than good for the patient is to have, 
what Bernard Williams would call, “one thought too many.”6 
To respect a person’s will, we must treat it as “structurally 
decisive,” according to Groll, which is to abide by it just 
because it is her will.7 
Groll’s concept of “structurally decisive” is going to be the 
main target of my analysis, so it is worth making sure that 
we fully understand the concept. According to Groll, to 
treat a will as structurally decisive, which is normatively how 
one always ought to treat a will expressed by a competent 
person about actions concerning his own person, is 
To treat it is as a “sufficiently weighty consideration” 
(697), “determining the course of action” (699), 
“authoritative” (700), “an order” (701), and 
“grounding a legitimate demand” (701). 
To not weigh it against other considerations (700), 
to treat it as “supplanting the reason-giving force 
of other considerations not because it outweighs 
them but because it silences or excludes them” 
(701), as “trumping whatever other considerations 
are on the table” (701), and as insensitive to 
considerations of the person’s good (701), for 
those appeals are irrelevant. (702) 
Groll writes that his point “basically amounts to the claim 
that some practical reasons function to silence, or preempt 
other considerations, and this is the idea behind the 
conception of someone’s will being structurally decisive.”8 
In what follows I will argue that Groll’s picture is not the 
normative position that we ought to adopt towards a 
person’s will. I will argue that respect for a person’s will 
requires attitudes and behaviors that result in a picture that 
is very different from Groll’s structurally decisive one. 
AN ALTERNATIVE TO “STRUCTURALLY DECISIVE”:
SUBSTANTIALLY WEIGHTY
Harry Frankfurt famously distinguished between the will as 
“first order desire,” the will as “second order desire,” and 
the will as “second order volition.”9 Whether or not one is 
persuaded by Frankurt’s hierarchical theory of free will, there 
are undoubtedly important normative differences between 
the different “types” of will that Frankfurt discusses, 
which Groll’s account ignores. To briefly recall Frankfurt’s 
distinctions, Frankfurt argues that a unique characteristic of 
persons is that they have the ability to reflect on their drives 
and desires (i.e., on their “first order desires”), and to take 
a stance on whether they want to have them (i.e., to form 
“second order desires”), and determine which of them they 
want to be effective in their actions (i.e., to form “second 
order volitions”).10 Thus, a smoker may have a first order 
desire to smoke, and may or may not want to continue to 
have that desire, but may not want that desire to actually 
be effective in his action. In other words, he might have a 
second order volition not to smoke even though he has a 
first order desire to smoke (and possibly even a second 
order one). 
To transfer these distinctions to Groll’s example of Bob, 
the competent patient who is refusing a PEG tube after a 
stroke, we know that Bob has a first order desire to avoid 
the PEG tube because he tells us so, but we know nothing 
about why he has that desire, what his stance is towards 
that desire, and whether that is the desire that he wants 
to be effective in action. In other words, we know nothing 
about Bob’s second order desires and volitions. Imagine, 
quite plausibly, that Bob is refusing the PEG tube because 
he is scared or because he overestimates the duration and 
intensity of his negative feelings about life with a PEG tube. 
This is not to say that Bob is not competent, for as Groll 
notes, Bob fully understands and appreciates the risks and 
benefits of accepting and refusing the PEG tube.11 I would 
argue that we should not treat Bob’s “will” as structurally 
decisive as Groll describes. Far from treating his “will” 
as authoritative, we should instead challenge Bob’s will, 
pointing out to him that the PEG tube would save his life, 
and that he should re-weigh this good and his “will” to avoid 
the unpleasantness of the PEG tube. We should dig deeper, 
challenging Bob to articulate his fears and concerns, 
pointing out to him that research indicates that people tend 
to overestimate the length and duration of their negative 
feelings and underestimate their power to adapt. Far from 
taking his will to be a silencer, a conversation ender, we 
should take his will to be the beginning of a conversation 
about the other reasons that Bob might have to accept 
the PEG tube, including reasons that have to do with his 
own good. Bob’s “will” to not have the PEG tube should 
be weighed, by Bob, with our input through exchange and 
dialogue, against the good that is his life. Bob’s life is not 
necessarily the ultimate good, but it is certainly not a good 
whose reasons in support of it should be silenced. 
In putting forth the normative stance that we should 
take towards Bob’s or any competent person’s will, I am 
reminded of Diana Meyers’s “skills-based, process view 
of autonomy.”12 The purpose of the skills that Meyers lists 
is to “[h]elp differentiate one’s own desires, values, and 
goals from the clamor of subordinating discourses and 
overwhelming social demands and how one can articulate 
and enact one’s own desires, values, and goals.”13 The skills 
that are employed towards this aim are introspection skills, 
communication skills that enable individuals to get the 
benefit of others’ perceptions and advice, memory skills 
that enable one to recall similar experiences, analytical 
and reasoning skills that enable individuals to assess 
the merits of the different visions of what their life could 
be like, self-nurturing skills, volitional skills that enable 
individuals to resist pressure, and interpersonal skills that 
enable individuals to join forces with others and challenge 
and change cultural and institutional arrangements that 
pathologize or marginalize certain persons or projects.14 
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The idea basically amounts to the claim that ideally the will 
is something that is formed and maintained by some sort 
of reflection process and by communicating with others to 
get their advice and perspectives. Challenging a person’s 
will, I would argue, enriches the epistemic and normative 
value of it, and is far from disrespectful. 
Groll might respond that he does not mean for his account to 
preclude the sort of challenging that I have just advocated. 
In fact, he even writes in a footnote that respecting Bob’s 
will “[i]s consistent with thinking that she [the doctor] ought 
to try to persuade Bob to change his mind.”15 Groll could 
claim that his account of structurally decisive just applies 
to the “end of the day” way in which we treat a competent 
person’s will respectfully. That up until final decision time 
we can challenge a person’s decision, critically engaging 
them with other options, arguments, empirical evidence, 
and other methods of persuasion. 
I do not, however, think that Groll’s account of structurally 
decisive treatment is compatible with this. He stresses, “The 
account I favor doesn’t pin the issue of permissibility to 
whether the paternalized subject has authority with respect 
to the choice/action in question. Instead, it pins it to the 
attitude of the person who does not treat the other person’s 
will as structurally decisive.”16 And that “the key question, 
then, for judging whether an instance of paternalism is 
(im) permissible turns on whether the paternalist is (partly) 
moved by the belief that her judgment is needed as a check 
or possible corrective on the judgment of the paternalized 
subject, and that this is at least part of why the paternalized 
subject’s will is not treated as structurally decisive.”17 
Groll could also argue that he is not making any larger 
normative claims about what one ought to do all things 
considered. He is articulating requirements for respecting 
a person’s will, but perhaps there are cases where the 
morally right thing to do is to not respect the person’s will 
in order to achieve some other good such as the person’s 
well-being. This could be right but there is no indication 
that Groll believes this. All of the evidence points to the 
fact that the will trumps everything, so long as we are 
talking about a situation where there are no harms to third 
parties, of course. Moreover, it would be an odd position 
to hold (and to have worked hard to establish) that it is 
disrespectful to fail to treat the will as structurally decisive, 
but then conclude that perhaps respecting the will is not so 
normatively important after all. 
All this having been said, I think that Groll is correct that 
we can fail to respect a person’s will if we fail to give it 
proper due. What I do not think Groll is correct about is 
that the way to respect “the will” is to give it some sort 
of silencing power. There is something in between 
disregarding someone’s will as part of the consideration of 
how one should act towards them and making it the only 
consideration on which one acts. Put simply, I think Groll 
over-corrected. What he should have said is that in order 
to respect a person’s will it must count as a substantially 
weighty reason in third-party deliberations about how to 
behave towards that person. Moreover, he should have 
paid attention to the Frankfurtian distinction between will 
as first order desire or drive, and one’s stance towards the 
desire or drives one finds oneself having. Surely it is the 
latter type of will that has the normative force that Groll 
attributes to “the will,” yet his account makes no mention 
of this. 
TREATING INCOMPETENT PERSONS’ WILLS AS
“SUBSTANTIALLY RELEVANT” 
Groll’s second major argument is that there are ways in 
which an incompetent person’s will should play a role in 
third-party decisions about how to act towards him despite 
the fact that he is incompetent (i.e., his will should be 
“substantially relevant” and not just for reasons derivative 
of well-being, that it would make him happy).18 I will argue 
that Groll faces a dilemma in this line of reasoning: either 
he takes a position that is underdeveloped and sufficiently 
vague to offer little to no practical normative guidance, or 
he takes a position that is not at all new and affords the 
will itself a very small role despite his claim to give it a 
substantially relevant role. 
Groll argues that when dealing with an incompetent 
person, third-person parties should be guided in part by 
what the person wills because he wills it.19 In Groll’s terms, 
the incompetent person’s will should still be treated as 
“substantially relevant.”20 Groll gives the example of Carl, 
who, like Bob, needs a PEG tube. But unlike Bob, Carl is 
incompetent. He is confused about where he is and why, 
and he does not understand the risks and benefits of 
refusing and accepting the PEG tube.21 Nonetheless, Carl 
does not want the PEG tube. What the physician (or rather, 
Carl’s legally designated surrogate decision maker) should 
do in this case, Groll argues, is think about how following 
Carl’s will contributes to his greater overall good, noting 
that overriding people’s wills generally upsets them.22 
When thinking along these lines, the physician or the 
surrogate is letting Carl’s will play a substantially relevant 
role, even though Carl is incompetent. 
Now, Groll admits that the role that the will is playing here 
is a minor role, derivative of the impact that overriding it 
versus following it has on well-being. But Groll argues that 
the will has a much more powerful, “non-derivative,” role in 
determining how we third parties ought to behave towards 
incompetent Carl.23 Groll writes, “[I] want to suggest that 
there is a second, and less obvious, way the incompetent 
patient’s will can contribute to his good: it can do so non-
derivatively, that is, simply in virtue of being followed.”24 
Complicating Groll’s claim is his admission that “Some 
incompetent patients cannot plausibly be said to have wills 
at all. Others perhaps do but they are sufficiently distorted 
by mental illness or some other affliction that we accord 
following them no non-derivative value.”25 
There are two problems with this proposal. One is the 
lack of any account of why the incompetent person’s 
will has non-derivative value such that it is in some way 
fundamentally good. But perhaps more concerning for the 
realm of medical ethics is what the theory would mean 
in practice. The first task in implementing this account in 
practice would be to decide where Carl falls in the “will 
spectrum” (e.g., not having a will, having a will that is 
“sufficiently distorted” to have no non-derivative value,” 
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having a will that is distorted or impaired in some way 
(after all, he is incompetent) but not enough to have no 
non-derivative value). But Groll gives us no guidance on 
this key determinant of what sort of role Carl’s will should 
play. The closest guide he gives us is to say, “One might . 
. . have enough of a picture of how one’s life should go to 
have autonomy be a constituent part of one’s well-being.”26 
But this is unhelpful. Does Carl have “enough” of a picture 
about how his life should go, a picture that is expressed in 
his statements about not wanting to have a PEG tube, to 
have a “will that has some non-derivative value”? All that 
we know about Carl is that he is confused about where 
he is and why and that he does not understand the risks 
and the benefits of the PEG tube. Even if we could identify 
where on the “will spectrum” Carl falls (e.g., having a will 
that is “somewhat” distorted but still retains some non-
derivative value), this characterization is not action-guiding. 
Our second task would be to decide how to behave with 
respect to Carl, and the position that his “will” ought to 
have “some” non-derivative value is sufficiently vague to 
offer little to no practical normative guidance. 
Groll seems to recognize the problems with the non-
derivative role of an incompetent person’s will, for he 
immediately turns back to the derivative thesis, writing 
that “Even if one rejects this idea, the first, uncontroversial 
point about how following an incompetent patient’s 
will can contribute to his well-being is all I need for the 
central contention I’m making here, namely, that it can 
make perfect sense for the surrogate to giver considerable 
weight . . . to Carl’s will, to the point of doing what Carl 
wants entirely because he wants it.”27 But it is incorrect 
to characterize the “because he wants it” (i.e., the will) as 
doing the heavy lifting as far as reason-giving power goes. 
If the surrogate follows incompetent Carl’s will, it will be 
because not following his will upsets him, or causes more 
harm than good. Thus Groll has a dilemma. Either he holds 
that the will of an incompetent person has a non-derivative 
role to play, in which case, he is saying something new 
and giving the will a substantial role, but offering a position 
that is ungrounded and offers limited practical normative 
guidance. Or, he holds that the will of an incompetent 
person has only a derivative role to play, in which case he 
is saying something that is not at all new and is offering a 
position that affords the will itself a small role. Neither of 
these is necessarily bad, but not what Groll is after. 
I say “not at all new” because in deciding how to behave 
with respect to incompetent patients, clinicians and 
scholars already do consider exactly what Groll proposes, 
namely, the question of whether there is more good to 
be produced from following the patient’s will than from 
overriding it. In other words, they already do treat the wills 
of incompetent persons as “substantially relevant.” It is for 
this reason that in psychiatric inpatient units, patients, even 
when incompetent, are not strapped down and injected 
with medications against their will unless they are at risk 
of immediate harm to self or other, or that when a patient 
who lacks decision making capacity refuses a surgery the 
clinicians try to wait out the situation as long as they can 
as opposed to wheeling her into surgery at that moment. 
In these cases, it is not the patient’s will as such that is the 
central normative concern (or playing a large reason giving 
role), but the patient’s well-being and the extent to which 
overriding his or her expressions (or “will”), even when 
incompetent, would cause him or her physical distress or 
harm. And this is the exact sort of role that an incompetent 
person’s will should play in third-party deliberations about 
how to treat him. 
CONCLUSION
I have argued that Groll’s account of the role that 
competent persons’ wills should play in third-party 
deliberations about their welfare should be rejected. 
Treating a competent person’s will as “silencing” (i.e., as 
“structurally decisive”) fails to enrich the epistemic and 
normative value of it. Moreover, doing so fails to allow us 
to answer questions about the status of the “will,” which 
is certainly of relevance to the question of the weight that 
the person’s will should afford. Respect does not require 
that the will be treated as “structurally decisive,” as Groll 
argues, but merely as “substantially weighty,” where the 
weight is determined by considerations of the status of 
the will, in addition to the person’s well-being. I have also 
argued that Groll’s account of the role that incompetent 
persons’ wills should play in third-party deliberations about 
their welfare is in need of an explanation of the threshold 
at which an incompetent person’s will no longer has any 
“non-derivative value,” and is also in need of an account 
of how having “some” non-derivative value would translate 
into actual practice with respect to giving incompetent 
persons’ wills weight. Finally, I have argued that Groll’s 
proposal that incompetent persons’ wills have derivative 
value in third-party deliberations about their welfare is not 
as novel as he presents it to be, but is the predominant way 
in which incompetent persons’ wills are considered in such 
deliberations. 
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5.	 Ibid., 700. 
6.	 Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge University Press, 1981), 
19. 
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8.	 Ibid., 701, fn. 19. 
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19. Ibid., 702. 
20. Ibid., 699. 
21. Ibid., 700. 
22. Ibid., 703. 
23. Ibid., 704. 
24. Ibid. 
25. Ibid. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Ibid., 705. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Frankfurt, Harry. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.” The 
Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): 5–20. 
Groll, Daniel. “Paternalism, Respect, and the Will.” Ethics 122 (2012): 
692–720. 
Meyers, Diana. Gender in the Mirror: Cultural Imagery and Women’s 
Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
Meyers, Diana. “Intersectional Identity and the Authentic Self: 
Opposites Attract.” In Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on 
Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self, edited by D. Mackenzie and S. 
Stoljar, 151–80. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000. 
Williams, Bernard. Moral Luck. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1981. 
Moral Relevance in the Concepts and 
Language of Human Synthetic Moral 
Enhancement 
Christian Carrozzo 
WASHINGTON HOSPITAL CENTER 
Philosophers and neuroscientists contributing to the 
literature on human synthetic enhancement are increasingly 
concentrated on its ethical implications. Synthetic human 
enhancement broadly concerns itself with cognitive, 
motor, or other effects on some human biological function, 
achieved by modalities other than the traditional. Although 
this increasing body of important work is well received in 
light of its worthwhile contributions to many traditional 
problems in moral philosophy,1 and though its original 
thesis appears relatively modest, as the literature expands 
and specific concepts and language begin to concretize as 
those most relevant and articulate, increasingly, confusion 
has also emerged as a result of what appear to be differing 
understandings and use of some of the core terms and 
concepts. This is more evident when the issue becomes 
more metaphysically focused on synthetically enhancing 
human morality, because of its conceptual, highly 
relativistic, and psychologically nuanced language, and 
its employment of questionable scientific assumptions, 
sometimes resulting in objectionable inconsistency or 
incoherence. 
Modalities of human synthetic enhancement are often only 
explored for their relevance to such matters of social equity 
as access, but are often dismissed as having any other 
legitimate moral relevance.2 This seems rather peculiar in my 
view, as some neuroscientists, geneticists, and chemists, not 
to mention bioengineers themselves, whether or not their 
professional designations involve bioethics, specifically 
engage in research conducted to inform or directly assist 
in the development of biotechnologies. Philosophers, 
and certainly those under the expanding umbrella of 
neuroethics, guide their moral investigations and to some 
degree determine the borders of their specializations by 
those very technological advancements, usually in the form 
of some new synthetic modality.3 Bypassing an analysis of 
modalities seems to miss the point as to why these specific 
developments, demanding such contemporary academic 
rigor, are presently salient to a significant interdisciplinary 
stratum concerned with value-based social import. No one 
has entered the human and moral enhancement debates 
to discuss the ethical dangers or the scientific plausibility 
of traditional modalities like education, socialization, 
rehabilitation, and so on. It is only the invasiveness and 
abruptness of bioengineered synthetic modalities for 
human and moral enhancement, alongside what some 
believe is their potential for elevating human moral status 
to a degree hitherto unknown, that have generated new 
questions regarding what ethical consequences could 
result, and whether we are being coherent (or responsible) 
in debating such propositions at all. 
To be clear: this paper is not intended to address the 
proposition of human synthetic enhancement in general, 
nor any moral responsibilities said to be generated from 
that general proposition, such as the occurrence of a 
synthetically driven, dramatic acceleration of cognitive 
functions, with which, some have argued, our traditional 
moral development would have trouble keeping pace;4 or 
the use of such possibly effectual but potentially unsafe 
biologically invasive methods, as opposed to traditional 
means. I do not specifically address their implications for 
health, access, or the social and political oppression of any 
resulting theoretical sub-group of the “unenhanced.” In 
fact, this paper does not address the normative question 
of whether or not human synthetic enhancements ought
to be pursued at all. Certainly, an answer to the general 
question of the societal and moral appropriateness of the 
human inclination to synthetically enhance I believe to be 
evidenced historically both in that very inclination itself, as 
well as in present human practices reflective of it. 
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Rather, the purpose of this essay is to examine the moral 
relevance of some general modalities and whether those 
traditionally conceived as relevant to the development of 
moral character can lend coherence to notions of moral 
enhancement as accomplished by synthetic means. That will 
be addressed both directly and through an examination of 
some problems with the common use of certain relativistic 
concepts, namely, moral status (when understood as 
defined by a threshold of personhood) and the term
enhancement (when understood as an improvement).
The essay also serves as commentary on the possible 
need to accept what I call a disintegration of traditional 
metaphysical concepts through scientific reduction for the 
sake of interdisciplinary conceptual coherence, and the 
importance of employing accurate scientific knowledge 
(or at least scientific prudence) when discussing proposals 
which can be subjected to charges of fanciful science, or 
even fiction. 
MORAL STATUS AS A THRESHOLD CONCEPT 
Within discussions of human synthetic enhancement are 
concerns over moral enhancements so profound they 
could lead to the creation of a new tier of moral status— 
one previously unknown, perhaps even beyond that of 
mere humans. Such speculations are often supported by 
the notion of biotechnologies that could somehow make 
us ontologically transcendent of our own personhood, 
creating “post-persons,” “supra-humans,” as it were. This 
may sound like science fiction, but the concern arises from 
how moral status traditionally (though not without bioethical 
controversy) has been attributed to beings. The two most 
significant categories of moral status are those of human 
and non-human beings, distinguished by criteria largely 
sympathetic to those of personhood. Until recently, the 
two categories were mostly used to distinguish the moral 
considerations we give ourselves against those which we 
offer non-human animals. Allen Buchanan (2009) reminds 
us that moral status is commonly assumed to be equally 
distributed among humans; it is treated as a threshold 
concept when we adhere to the notion that personhood 
carries the core criteria for having it. That is, should 
something hold those cognitive features understood to be 
defining of personhood, then the moral status presently 
understood to be the highest is appropriately attributed 
equally to all who satisfy those criteria. The proposition is 
tricky because even the criteria associated with personhood 
remain unclear in terms of whether humans are the only 
ones who may lay claim to them, particularly the cognitive 
criteria. The problem is also in part philosophically 
inherited from the widely accepted Kantian notion that 
moral standing is determined by the capacity for practical 
rationality, which is peculiarly human. Generally, the criteria 
for personhood, and thus the justification for attribution of 
the highest known moral status, is understood to include 
rationality, the use of language, self-awareness, agency, 
and moral worth or moral standing. As Hauskeller (2013) 
notes, our general tendency to ascribe moral status is for 
the convenience of not running through this weighty list 
when indicating a difference in the capacities that strike us 
as morally relevant. 
Although often used and defined interchangeably, an 
important distinction is made between moral status and 
moral standing by Buchanan (2009). The concept of moral 
status is a comparative one; various beings may have 
different moral status. To what moral standing refers, on 
the other hand, is a matter of an appreciable and intrinsic 
moral claim on behalf of one’s values.5 The following may 
be a useful practical distinction. An ideal animal ethics 
notwithstanding, humans would seem to attribute moral 
status across all sentient things and in accordance with 
biologically informed moral values. But I can value an 
organism by as fundamental a biological virtue as it simply 
being a living thing, giving it moral standing without the 
need to project onto it a metaphysics of moral status. Or, I 
can choose not to intrinsically value an organism and merely 
value it for the food it will provide, or the practical assistance 
it offers, in moral disregard of its consciousness and thus 
its moral standing, obviating thereby any considerations of 
status, per se. This distinction, however, will help better 
define what role moral status could possibly play in the 
examination to follow. 
Moral status is now topical for those exploring human 
synthetic enhancement because of the concern for the 
possibility of synthetically reaching a status beyond that 
which humans currently have, one which would then be 
understood to be the highest, creating new categories of 
beings, with the social and ontological implications already 
mentioned. Charges of science fiction aside, the term
status in the context of human enhancement bears with it 
quite a few difficulties, most of which seem to come from 
the common assumption that it is a threshold concept. 
Buchanan believes that moral status as a threshold notion 
is the most intuitive appreciation of the concept. This may 
have been the case when the concept was mainly used 
in bioethical discourse to distinguish the moral position 
of humans over non-human animals, but it becomes 
problematic when discussing the potential effect of human 
enhancement to our present use of the concept. 
Including non-human animals in our assessment of moral 
status satisfies the comparative quality requisite of the 
definition of a status, but it does so only by contrasting 
human with non-human beings. If we follow Buchanan’s 
distinction between status and standing, “two beings 
can have moral standing, but one may be of higher moral 
status” (2009), but also remain consistent with Kant’s 
criteria that in order to have moral standing a being must 
hold an appreciable capacity for practical rationality, then 
both those two beings must of necessity be human, and 
we are left only with human subjects between which to 
determine higher or lower status (and non-humans are left 
out of contention entirely since according to Kant they lack 
even base moral standing). This is, of course, contradictory 
to the “moral equality assumption” (Buchanan 2009), and 
therefore precludes any notion of personhood or moral 
status as a threshold concept, since it now appears we 
can establish different statuses among those persons and 
can no longer claim they have the same status by simply 
meeting the criteria for personhood. This, without the 
need of establishing a threat to that assumption by way of 
a new moral status category indicative of an even higher 
imaginative threshold, demanding of as yet undefined and 
unforeseeable criteria for supra-personhood as a result of 
human synthetic enhancement.6 
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If we follow what Buchanan reminds us is Bentham’s view 
of moral standing under Buchanan’s definition of the term, 
then the only criterion for moral standing is sentience, 
which would require our assessment of status then to be 
adjudicated across all sentient beings, human and non­
human. This take on standing would seem to support a 
threshold notion, as it once again allows the criteria for 
personhood to be what defines a higher moral status for 
humans against all other sentient, non-human beings. 
Again, personhood is defined as demanding rationality, 
the use of language, self-consciousness, agency, and 
having moral worth or standing. In some ways the claim 
that these criteria are met only by human beings is simply 
biologically antiquated. The concept of rationality may be 
defined in a way in which it remains only applicable to 
human beings, but the use of language (which was claimed 
to be fundamental to our ability for rational thought),7 
self-awareness,8 agency, and as we have just explored, 
moral worth or standing, are all capacities to some degree 
contemporarily verifiable—or at least biologically worth 
investigation—in non-human animals as well, evidence for 
the more appropriate notion that non-humans are located 
elsewhere than us, but nonetheless on the same continuum 
or gradient of personhood. If there is no threshold for 
personhood, then of what significance is attributing status 
at all, except to distinguish different degrees of facility and 
capacity for those things we say constitute personhood? 
And if this is the case, should not moral status also be on 
a gradient between all beings? Or if the use of the term 
status carries inherently the notion of a threshold, than 
why not do away with it entirely?9 Regardless of the truth 
of our ethical relations with other non-human beings, or 
with one another, this would appear the more appropriate 
appreciation in the twenty-first century. 
Indeed, the notion of merely all humans (let alone non-
humans) having equal moral status is an ethical and social 
ideal. How humans view and assess moral status is rarely 
consistent with such an ideal. Historical evidence of this is 
well exemplified by the ethical tradition of utilitarianism, 
the most broadly applied of consequentialist ethical 
theories, which has been formulated and adopted in 
explicit disregard of the “moral equality assumption,” on 
its own moral grounds, for centuries. Surely, utilitarians 
take the view that moral status is a matter of moral 
considerability, and not a threshold concept. It is not the 
basic moral standing of what it is to be a person that guides 
a utilitarian decision to elect among many satisfying that 
basic criterion, who will be ethically sacrificed for the 
greater good. It is instead a definition and appreciation 
of a consequentialist greater good. As Buchanan at least 
theoretically speculates about how to define moral status 
for utilitarians, “there is only gradation, a continuum of 
beings with lesser or greater capacity for well-being and 
harm, and sacrificing some beings for the sake of others 
further along the continuum is always in principle not only 
permissible, but even required” (2009). 
Interesting here is the ironic neo-Aristotelian notion about
virtue theory as in practice fundamental to not only the
development of contextually appropriate morality and
moral character, but therefore also underlying a developed
moral agent’s structuring of any consequentialist theories,
including utilitarianism. Philosophers have indicated a belief
that the moral aspect of an enhancement would likely come
from an improvement to those cognitive capacities that
“jointly constitute our practical reasoning,” and as a result
those enhanced would be “better informed, and better able
to reason about relevant moral facts than we are,”10 perhaps
determining themselves to be of higher moral status by
virtue of something we can’t imagine,11 but nevertheless
based on criteria indicative of an improved moral agency.
Should we be convinced of a cognitive superiority in those
enhanced, this would in no way indicate that they know
things that we do not.12 Those determined to have an
enhanced moral status would still need to recognize and
reason through the morally salient facts of any given matter;
they may simply be better equipped in their capacity to do
so. Assessing differing moral statuses among humans by
way of utilitarianism is, of course, inconsistent with a virtue
ethics, which although unfortunately contradicted by human
practical realities would support moral status (regardless of
what may be considered the most intuitive or contemporarily
appropriate use of the term) as a threshold concept, as this
would be most theoretically consistent with the precepts of
its founding theory. Virtue, after all, defines and refines itself
by the practical insistence on an ideal. 
ENHANCEMENT AS IMPROVEMENT 
This pushes us to an appreciation of the relativistic nature 
of the term enhancement itself. If we are supposedly 
measuring some type of improvement, betterment, or 
positive alteration, and depending upon what kind, that 
itself also requires ethical qualification by contrast to 
contextual particulars. This, I think, is further important when 
considering proposed synthetic alterations to traditional 
morality. Synthetic enhancements, by the nature of the 
modality, simply bypass any practical reasoning or moral 
prudence from which the agent develops anything directly 
contributive to his or her moral character as traditionally 
defined. As John Harris rightly points out, the kinds of traits 
or behavioral dispositions that lead us to “wickedness 
or immorality” (2010), are also those associated with the 
development of virtues and any sense whatever of a moral 
life. 
How could moral agency be influenced synthetically? 
That presupposes a sufficiently adequate, reductive 
understanding of the biology behind moral agency, which 
would necessarily include coming to terms with science’s 
current state of knowledge of related causal biological 
mechanisms, which is presently insufficient, if not 
contradictory, to the cause. At best, a proposal for synthetic 
moral influence at all would likely consist in affecting the 
outcome of moral deliberation by its effects on how we 
tend to behave. What cannot be said about a change in 
tendency is that an enhancement of any sort has necessarily 
occurred. Buchanan takes for granted the definition of 
the term as signifying to “augment, increase, improve, 
to make better” (2009). His claim is that enhancement is 
best understood in this context and in this way because 
it pertains strictly to affecting human biological capacities 
as evaluated only against the functional norm of those 
capacities, and isolated from external influence, accepting 
that it thus does not guarantee said improved capacities 
would “make us better, overall.”13 
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Establishing a functional norm is clearly a metaphysical 
requirement for the concept of a functional enhancement. 
In my view, one cannot discuss any enhancement, in 
particular those that attempt to affect a socially influenced 
concept such as morality, as physically isolated, involving 
just the biological capacity only in contrast to that 
capacity’s functional norm without dragging in at least 
some external, human-relational considerations. Even 
the pre-enhanced norm of that biological capacity is 
developmentally informed, at least in part, in accordance to 
human interactions with environmental particulars. Use of 
such language otherwise sounds suspiciously dualistic, as 
it would imply that environmental circumstances in effect 
during human biological development as physicalists 
understand it are distinct from what developmentally affects 
the mind. Certainly cognitive synthetic enhancements
targeting the brain, the biological system responsible for 
the conceptual understanding and exercising of morality 
or, at a minimum, housing the psychological basis for our 
affective and behavioral dispositions, cannot be considered 
moral enhancements as improvements or as having made 
anything better through an isolated evaluation of the 
system and through a mere physicalist lens without some 
reference to the external factors that have biologically 
influenced its development and sustain its necessary 
normal function. 
As mentioned, this paper does not address the general 
proposition of human synthetic enhancement’s ethical 
implications, nor does it address transhumanism. This is not 
intended to be insensitive to the concerns of transhumanism, 
and we can certainly learn from a few specific examples 
of novel and sophisticated biotechnological applications 
in order to shed light on the moral relevance of human 
synthetic enhancement. Neil Harbisson was diagnosed with 
achromatopsia. He teamed with Adam Montandon, associate 
professor at Erhvervsakademiet Lillebaelt Academy, to 
develop a device that was subsequently implanted into 
Harbisson’s cortex and protrudes externally from his brain 
while capturing with a small camera color data which is 
then interpreted by Harbisson as distinct sounds, each 
consistently representative of a distinct color.14 Harbisson’s 
experience may have nothing to do with transhumanism 
due to the biotechnology in this case being of a corrective 
nature, rather than purposed to provide a human being 
with a capacity beyond what is considered normal (which 
is a standard precept of a transhumanistic modality), but it 
helps to clarify the moral relevance of modalities and the 
contextually relativistic charges against how to interpret 
a notion of enhancement. Although the specific kind of 
synthetic modality which he has chosen can clearly be 
said to have caused an alteration of an abnormal biological 
capacity to something more consistent with the human 
functional norm—an alteration which sufficiently meets 
Buchanan’s biologically isolating definition of enhancement
as improvement—part of why the enhancement is of value 
to Harbisson (i.e., why color was so important to him, why 
he doesn’t mind an artifact semi-permanently protruding 
from his brain, why he accepts and enjoys the change in 
his thinking and cognitive processes, and so on) remains 
subject to his moral character, and that character remains 
developmentally subject to the complex variety of moral, 
social, and biologically influential particulars to which he 
has been exposed throughout the course of his life. Any 
synthetic enhancement to any biological function will 
eventuate in a value judgment in the form of a comparison 
relative to what is considered normal. The key here is that 
what is normal is itself constituted by an assessment of 
the enhanced function within its extended environment, 
and that in turn is what allows the subject to which it has 
occurred to be able to call it an improvement or not, as 
defined by its relative social and moral import. A value 
judgment is necessary even within the most physicalist 
appreciation of any “enhancement” to biological function. 
Clearly, the demand for moral relevance is made more 
complicated when we claim to have achieved a synthetic 
enhancement to morality itself. Without a morally qualifying 
context, an enhancement is merely an alteration and not 
an improvement. The common definition and use of the 
term enhancement are taken for granted as value-laden 
because the term itself carries with it an anticipation of 
such a context. 
REDUCING THE LANGUAGE OF MORAL
ENHANCEMENT 
Once we start speaking of morality in its psychologically 
defining terms, such as “behavioral and affective 
dispositions,” we have already performed a partial reduction 
or translation, and therefore can be more clear about how 
synthetic, non-traditional modalities have an effect on 
those things. What may be a primary responsibility for 
those who wish to engage in scientifically coherent debates 
over the ethical implications of moral enhancement is the 
development of an agreed-upon conception of morality 
that detaches it from the traditional notion. 
The concept of morality presently articulated in debates 
about synthetic enhancement is that conceived by 
traditional philosophy, the metaphysics and practical 
development of which can be found in virtue theory, and 
therefore conceptually disallow any synthetic modalities 
as relevant to moral character. Synthetic modalities, 
however, are appropriately scientific as they relate to 
affecting or assisting human biological functioning through 
scientifically developed technologies. Morality is not a 
human biological function. It would seem, then, that to hold 
coherent debates over moral enhancement by synthetic 
modalities requires that the concept of morality be subject 
to scientific reduction, a translation which could render 
the language of morality consistent with the language of 
the proposed biologically affective synthetic modality. 
Clearly, that is not an easy task, as it is tantamount to the 
neuroscientific goal of discovering biological correlates to 
those complex behaviors understood to be manifestations 
of human morality. However, it is one thing to accomplish 
this lofty goal, and another to sufficiently translate in order 
to begin to implement terminology which at our present 
stage of discovery we could claim is epistemically safe to 
use. Beginning to discuss moral character as “behavioral 
and affective dispositions” takes us a step in that direction, 
as we make the reductive move away from the language of 
moral philosophy (with all of its metaphysical hazards in a 
scientific context) to the language of psychology. We are 
now in the scientific realm, at least, and thus closer to being 
able to be coherent about synthetic, scientifically based 
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enhancements ever having an effect on something like 
moral character. Though not the project of this paper, one 
could then carefully continue the translation or correlation 
process from “behavioral and affective dispositions” to, 
for instance, known complex behavioral and emotional 
correlates to these dispositions at the neurological or 
endocrinal level, further developing a possible causal 
relation between proposed modalities known to affect 
these particular human systems. Again, although the 
necessary science has yet to arrive at a stage in which this 
kind of reduction can be completed, some scientists already 
use this terminology without invoking the metaphysics 
of morality as traditionally defined to complete their 
propositions. However, this, too, sometimes also results in 
tacit assumptions when dealing with complex philosophical 
concepts, adding to interdisciplinary incoherence. Two 
thousand and some odd years of moral philosophy in the 
old tradition could not anticipate the scientific revelations 
related to human function to which we are now being 
exposed, and which contribute to our reasoning and 
present investigations—things inconsistent with many 
prior metaphysical commitments. To employ a less than 
accurate or adequate knowledge of the relevant science in 
philosophical discussions over the alteration of particular 
human biological functioning, and to causally relate the 
consequences of those alterations to things metaphysical 
without something like an established reductive process 
which makes clear how the biological elements can be 
bridged to the features of what we understand to be the 
associated metaphysical concepts, would seem a less than 
productive philosophical exercise and rather scientifically 
obtuse. 
The most problematic proposals associated with the pursuit 
of synthetic, scientifically based moral enhancement 
are any that suggest that what is to be enhanced is not 
simply (though there is nothing simple about it) moral 
character but specific virtues. In light of current promising 
biotechnologies, and initiating proactive efforts in research 
explicitly dedicated to applicable advancements, Mark 
Walker believes we may someday be capable of identifying 
genetic correlates to personality traits which psychologists 
have claimed to be related to aspects of human character, 
and manipulate them in order for their expression to 
result in an enhancement of those traits and thus, in his 
view, with enough specificity to affect particular virtues. 
In short, his proposed Genetic Virtue Program (GVP) is for 
a “research program designed to discover whether there 
are genetic correlates of virtue that are clear, strong, and 
open to manipulation.”15 Responses to this work of fiction, 
as Walker himself put it, were “largely unsympathetic.” 
This is a proposition the scientific basis of which is 
considered entirely erroneous by biologists, since genes 
play absolutely no role in encoding neurons, let alone 
complex human behavior. This was pointed out in response 
to Walker by Athena Andreadis, a prominent cell biologist, 
who claimed that “the notion that any complex behavior 
can be changed by pressing the button of a single gene is 
entirely unsupported by biological evidence of any scale, 
whether genomic, molecular, cellular, or organismic.”16 
Any suggestion that virtues as traditionally conceived 
can be synthetically enhanced combines in the most 
blatant and erroneous manner the two main dangers 
of incoherence I’ve attempted to articulate throughout 
this paper. Virtues, by definition, can only be acquired, 
refined, or enhanced by exercising our practical reasoning, 
with continued exposure to often highly complicated 
circumstances in which excessive and thus ethically 
objectionable dispositions of moral character are truncated 
in efforts to identify what is ethically optimal, leading to 
the identification of a more contextually appropriate good 
and thus an inclination to act in one manner as opposed to 
another. Nick Agar expresses his confusion about the use 
of the term virtue here as “slightly puzzling considering that 
the idea of moral enhancement seems against the spirit of 
virtue ethics. One of the central themes of virtue ethics is 
the importance of striking a balance.”17 To say that one is 
virtuous in the ways of justice is merely to say that one 
has been exposed to enough scenarios in which one has 
exercised this balance, despite circumstances that could 
have led one to react in either excess or deficiency of what 
would be considered morally appropriate. Here, again, 
are the conceptual problems we have already discussed 
related to the use of terms such as moral character, further 
complicating the metaphysical inheritance of our language 
by using the term virtue. A synthetic enhancement to be 
more just is incoherent, as the moral particulars must be 
present and subject to reasoning in order to determine 
what, in fact, justice is in any given case. Some conceptual 
reduction may be in order to either develop a new concept 
that can “converse” with scientific fact, or translate to terms 
which make the conversation coherent. Of course, there is 
no assurance that whether attempting this with morality, 
moral character, or something even more conspicuously 
problematic in light of its theoretical intricacies such as 
virtue would result in anything but the disintegration or 
all-out elimination of those concepts. This is perhaps 
something we should be willing to accept for the sake of 
being able to move forward with such investigations in a 
productive manner. Even if the science were anywhere near 
developing the precise capacity to identify personality sub-
traits correlated to the genetic expressions by which they 
manifest, in no way does that provide us with coherence 
when discussing matters related to synthetic virtue. As R. 
H. Sprinkle comments on what Aristotle himself would think 
in relation to genetic enhancement of moral character, “the 
enduring behaviors that we recognize as moral character 
or collectively as human nature—or even primate nature— 
must be counted as especially complex and unlikely to 
be reducible to single genes or to single dominant, co-
dominant, recessive, or sex-linked alleles.”18 To entertain the 
possibility that virtue is able to be enhanced synthetically 
through genetic intervention takes both the incoherence 
problem between traditionally conceived moral language 
and biologically based concepts, as well as the issue of 
considering the ethical implications of fanciful science, to 
an unfortunate degree. There is great difference between 
discussing through conjecture the plausibility of the field 
of behavioral genetics someday reaching its as-of-yet 
theoretical and reductive goals of discovering complex 
behavioral correlates in single genes alongside ruminations 
of the morally relevant sort, and the proposal of a distinct 
interdisciplinary project to somehow synthetically enhance 
virtue for the sake of human good and the elimination of 
“evil,” as it were. Persson and Savulescu, having come 
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under attack for generating what may be interpreted as a 
similar moral imperative, at least concede responsibly to 
the requirement of significant advances in science before 
something like moral enhancement can happen.19 
As William K. Frankena once put it, “I think that moral 
philosophers cannot insist too much on the importance of 
factual knowledge and conceptual clarity for the solution 
of moral and social problems.”20 Traditional concepts 
of morality and moral character are developed through 
traditional modalities, making their relevance to matters 
of moral enhancement central, and underlining the 
need for scientific translation if we intend to articulate 
a convincing and coherent causal relationship with 
synthetic enhancements. Reductive processes may be 
necessary even if they result in conceptual disintegration 
or the necessity for novel, interdisciplinary conceptions 
altogether. Further, certain philosophical considerations 
in all of this seem to be either significantly ahead of or 
sufficiently vague in relation to the norms of the science 
that would be required; or at times simply oblivious to what 
is in fact a particular scientific subject’s present status. It 
may be a simple matter of philosophical prudence. 
NOTES 
1.	 Moral development and responsibility, human moral status and/ 
or standing to include non-human animal rights and personhood, 
theories of knowledge and intelligence, to name a few. 
2.	 This seemed to be the general consensus at the most recent 
meeting of the Presidential Commission for the Study of 
Bioethical Issues in Washington, D.C., focused on the ethical 
implications of human enhancements. In attendance as invited 
speakers were Peter Reiner and Nick Bostrom who, upon being 
asked by Commission Chair Amy Gutmann, conceded that the 
ethical implications of human synthetic enhancements could 
be analyzed without consideration for the source modality. 
Once this was concluded, the question of access was raised, 
at which point Peter Reiner amended his answer to say that all 
other considerations being equal (including access), modalities 
remained morally irrelevant. See http://bioethics.gov/meetings. 
3.	 As may be obvious in the literature referenced, philosophers do 
not require the science to be anywhere as advanced as would 
be needed for a legitimately normative assessment of ethical 
implications in order to presently speculate on what implications 
could arise given certain kinds of biotechnological advances. 
Indeed, given the subject matter, some of these speculations 
have been charged with bordering on science fiction. 
4.	 Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu, “The Perils of Cognitive 
Enhancement and the Urgent Imperative to Enhance the Moral 
Character of Humanity,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 25, no. 3 
(2008): 162–77. 
5.	 As Buchanan further illustrates the point, Bentham’s value of 
mere sentience led him to the ethical assertion that all such 
beings have moral standing. For Kant, it was his value of the 
capacity for practical rationality that determined whom (or what) 
he believed deserved this moral qualification. 
6.	 Though explicitly not the subject of this paper, this rids us also 
of the necessity to fictionalize “post-persons” and the like on 
behalf of a new tier of moral status, and therefore avoids the 
social and political tyranny to the “unenhanced” suggested by 
some to be a result of the creation of such beings. In light of an 
elevation on a continuum or gradient of the capacities known 
to define personhood, there could instead be great optimism 
for an enlightenment of sorts, as opposed to the pessimism 
of an expected oppression by new beings who would, 
though improved in their moral agency, somehow regard us 
unsympathetically. (Fair to both positions is the recognition that 
these contemplations are all, for the time being, quite fictional.) 
7.	 See Bekoff, Kako, and Hauser et al. for studies related to the use 
of language or its cognitive precepts in non-human animals. 
8.	 See Patterson and Cohn, and Parker et al. for studies related to 
self-awareness in non-human animals. 
9.	 A possible third option in addition to the commonly debated 
threshold or continuum/gradient understanding of moral 
enhancement, referred to as plateau, is proposed by Douglas in 
response to Buchanan. 
10. Nicholas Agar, 	“Still Afraid of Needy Post-Persons,” Journal of 
Medical Ethics (2012). doi: 10.1136/medethics-2012-101095. 
11. Agar calls this the inexpressibility problem. 
12. Michael Hauskeller, “The Moral Status of Post-Persons,” Journal 
of Medical Ethics 39, no. 2 (2013): 76-77. 
13.	 Allen Buchanan, “Moral Status and Human Enhancement,” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 37, no. 4 (2009): 346–81. 
Assuming here that by “overall” he means once we evaluate the 
“enhancement” against the outside world and thus are able to 
weigh-in the ethical implications. 
14. Liz Else, “A Cyborg Makes Art 	Using Seventh Sense,” New 
Scientist 215, no. 2877 (2012): 50. 
15.	 Mark Walker, “In Defense of the Genetic Virtue Program: A 
Rejoinder,” Politics and the Life Sciences 29, no. 1 (2010): 90–96. 
16. This isn’t to say that the field of behavioral genetics has not seen 
its share of advances along with failures in reaching this goal. 
Athena Andreadis, “The Tempting Illusion of Genetic Virtue,” 
Politics and the Life Sciences 29, no. 1 (2010): 76–78. 
17.	 Nicholas Agar, “Enhancing Genetic Virtue?” Politics and the Life 
Sciences 29, no. 1 (2012): 73–75. 
18. R. H. Sprinkle, “Moral Suasion, Installed,” 	Politics and the Life 
Sciences 29, no. 1 (2010): 88-89. 
19.	 Persson and Savalescu, “The Perils of Cognitive Enhancement.” 
20. William K. Frankena, Frankena’s Ethics, Foundations of Philosophy 
Series (Prentice Hall, 1973), 25. 
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Moral Enhancement 
Fabrice Jotterand 
REGIS UNIVERSITY 
Under the auspices of the Committee on Philosophy and 
Medicine, a panel on the topic of moral enhancement was 
organized at the Central Division meeting of the American 
Philosophical Association in St. Louis, MO, on February 
21, 2015. The panel was composed of Nicole Vincent, 
Jeffrey Bishop, and Veljko Dubljevic, and was moderated 
by Fabrice Jotterand. The panelists were invited to 
address issues surrounding the philosophical implications 
of moral enhancement including 1) the background on 
the meaning of moral enhancement, 2) an update of the 
latest developments in neuroscience related to moral 
enhancement, and 3) the philosophical/ethical questions 
raised by moral enhancement. In what follows, each panelist 
provides a short summary of his or her presentation. 
The first essay, by Veljko Dubljevic, suggests an approach to 
moral judgment (ADC model) and outlines its implications 
for the moral enhancement debate. 
Implications of the ADC Model of Moral Judgment for the 
Theoretical Feasibility of “Moral Enhancement” 
Veljko Dubljević, Banting Postdoctoral Fellow at the 
Neuroethics Research Unit, Institut de recherches cliniques 
de Montréal (IRCM), and Department of Neurology and 
Neursurgery, McGill University, Montréal, Canada 
The ADC framework (Dubljevic and Racine 2014a,b) 
proposes a novel integrative approach to moral judgment 
that could explain how unconscious heuristic processes are 
transformed into consciously accessible moral intuitions: it 
uses the heuristic principle of “attribute substitution” to 
explain how people make intuitive judgments. The target 
attributes of moral judgments are moral blameworthiness 
and praiseworthiness, which are substituted with more 
accessible and computable information about (A) an 
agent’s virtues and vices, (D) right/wrong deeds, and (C) 
good/bad consequences. 
The ADC framework has implications for empirical research 
of moral judgment and for the moral enhancement debate— 
namely, an important constraint was the question of the 
normative baseline according to which any “enhancement” 
effect can be measured. The standard approach assumes 
the epistemic authority of the dual systems model of moral 
judgment (e.g., Greene 2008), which postulates that System 
1 processes generate intuitive moral judgments, which are 
fallible, whereas System 2 processes generate deliberate 
reasoning. Moral enhancement, then, could consist in 
inhibiting the System 1, while at the same time enhancing 
System 2 processes (Persson and Savulescu 2012). Even 
those critical of the moral enhancement project seem to 
endorse this dual process view (see, e.g., Shook 2012). 
Indeed, this view resonates with traditional philosophical 
views—the idea that, in order to act morally, a person’s 
rational side needs to prevail over the instinctive nature. 
However, with the advent of the integrative ADC model and 
empirical support it garnered from cognitive psychology 
(Bialek et al. 2014), the dynamics of System 1 and System 
2 processes in moral judgment are put in a different 
perspective: all moral judgments seem to be intuitive and 
heuristics driven. Thus, direct interventions that affect the 
environment-heuristic fit and perhaps motivation to act 
after evaluation has been performed are more likely to 
succeed. 
Notwithstanding the practical limitations of moral 
enhancement (see Specker et al. 2014), the drive to supplant 
traditional approaches with evidence-based interventions 
to moral improvement has face-validity. However, even 
though there is some evidence that stimulants (e.g., 
Adderall) may offer motivational enhancement (Ranisch 
et al. 2013), an important implication of the ADC model 
is that most currently proposed interventions are “blunt 
instruments.” 
A different approach (more in line with the ADC view) 
involves aligning social norms with motivational “nudges” 
at specific, morally relevant decisions. The classic example 
concerns organ donation. Even though the vast majority 
consciously supports organ donation as morally laudable, 
the actual decisions are constrained by the environment-
heuristic fit. Certain countries like Austria use an “opt­
out” organ donation system (one is automatically a donor 
unless registering to not be). As a result, 99 percent 
of the population are registered organ donors. Other 
countries use a “consent-in” policy. The result is that a 
mere 12 percent are registered organ donors (Johnson 
and Goldstein 2003). As there is empirical support to the 
ADC approach supposition that “default heuristic” and 
social norm processing are connected (Everett et al. 2014), 
future research into empirical feasibility and normative 
applicability of the approach seems promising, especially 
in the context of the “moral enhancement” debate. 
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* * * 
The second essay, by Nicole A. Vincent, addresses 
questions related to the unexpected consequences of 
emerging technologies, with a particular focus on cognitive 
enhancement technologies. 
OUTSMARTED: Cognitive Enhancement and the Unexpected 
Consequences of Emerging Technologies 
Nicole A. Vincent, Department of Philosophy, Georgia State 
University, Atlanta, GA, USA 
Emma A. Jane, School of Arts and Media, University of New 
South Wales, Sydney, NSW, Australia 
The presentation, delivered by Nicole A. Vincent, provided 
an overview of the four main ideas behind a book that 
we are writing under the same title as this talk. One, that 
without adequate regulation, cognitive enhancement 
may become a new “normal”—a de facto standard that 
pressures everyone to enhance themselves. Two, that such 
pressure would be regrettable since, in addition to eroding 
our freedom, it would also hand over control in shaping 
society to the invisible hand of competition. Three, that it 
is fruitful to understand such pressure to enhance as an 
unexpected social side effect of an emerging technology. 
And four, that risks of such social side effects are just as 
important as risks of medical side effects. 
What binds these four ideas together is our contention 
that, to exercise adequate control over our lives, how we 
regulate emerging technologies should be informed by an 
ongoing—and, where possible, an antecedent—discussion 
about what kind of society would foster human flourishing. 
In contrast with the all too common disinclination in 
modern liberal democracies to build substantive political 
conceptions of the good into regulatory regimes, we 
argue that this is precisely what is needed for responsible 
human agency. To glimpse why we contend this, consider 
a stark contrast between debates over physical and mental 
performance enhancement. 
The dominant stance on physical performance 
enhancement in professional sport is shaped not just by 
concerns about effectiveness, safety, and equity of access. 
Rather, it is also shaped by a clear vision of what sport is 
and should be about—namely, athletes, their efforts, and 
their achievements. Admittedly, many of the substances 
and techniques currently used are medically unsafe, and 
so regulators indeed implement bans on doping in part so 
that athletes do not feel pressured to dope just to remain 
competitive (because for all they know others already do, 
and so too must they if they wish to remain competitive). 
But note that reasons to retain anti-doping regulations 
in professional sports would remain even if doping was 
medically safe and available to everyone. For instance, 
we simply may not wish sport to become (even more) 
dominated by a technological and scientific arms race in 
which athletes and their achievements increasingly recede 
into the background. 
Yet, such teleological and perhaps even aesthetic 
considerations are often marginalized in the debate 
about mental performance enhancement. The pressure to 
enhance by using side-effect-free and effective medications 
and devices is seen as morally on a par with professionals 
needing to keep their skills up to date. Cognitive enhancers 
are likened to caffeine and pain killers, which are viewed as 
innocuous. People who would rather opt out of cognitively 
enhancing themselves—especially once their concerns 
about safety, effectiveness, and equity of access are 
allayed—are ridiculed by enhancement enthusiasts as anti-
progressive technophobic Luddites. And neither the desire 
to avoid a cognitive enhancement arms race nor a distaste 
for the vision of a faster-paced and more efficient future 
society where everyone enhances themselves to keep up 
with this new “normal” is seen as a legitimate reason for us 
right now to refrain from cognitively enhancing ourselves. 
How we regulate mental performance enhancement has 
the potential to affect many aspects of how we live our 
whole lives. On the other hand, how physical performance 
enhancement is regulated affects human conduct in the 
domain of sport. And yet, despite the significantly higher 
stakes in the cognitive enhancement debate, paradoxically 
that is precisely where more resistance is encountered to 
recognizing the urgent need for regulation in order to avoid 
undesirable and to secure desirable social outcomes. In a 
way, such resistance to regulation in the broader context 
is understandable. After all, how we choose to regulate 
cognitive enhancement technology has the potential to 
have impact on so many aspects of our lives. But given 
that a “hands-off” approach to the regulation of cognitive 
enhancement simply hands over control in shaping society 
to processes that are unconcerned with human flourishing, 
we think that a hands-off approach is not just unwise but 
actually irresponsible. 
Law and morality often play catch-up to science and 
technology. Scientific and technological developments 
shape our lives—often imperceptibly—by gradually 
changing our values and the moral, legal, and social 
landscape in which we operate as agents. Against this 
backdrop, our book’s aim is neither to advocate for 
cognitive enhancement nor to portend of dystopic brave 
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new worlds that lurk around the bend, but to reflect on 
how development of this emerging technology should be 
regulated so that people flourish, rather than allowing its 
effects on society to determine how we shall live our lives. 
* * * 
The third and last essay, by Jeffrey P. Bishop, looks at the 
context in which the debate over moral enhancement takes 
place. 
Neuroscience and Other Political Schemes 
Jeffrey P. Bishop, MD, PhD, Tenet Endowed Chair in Health 
Care Ethics, Professor of Philosophy, Director, Albert Gnaegi 
Center for Health Care Ethics, St. Louis University 
Neuroscience is really a combination of two distinct realms 
of science. On one side sits neurobiology, which has its 
concepts, theories, models, empirical methods, technical 
apparatuses, and statistical approaches to interpreting 
its findings. On the other side sits the psychological and 
social sciences, which carry their own concepts, theories, 
models, empirical methods, and statistical approaches to 
interpreting its findings. Neuroscience, then, is the attempt 
to bring together these two distinct sciences and to attempt 
to find statistically significant correlations between them. 
The social and psychological sciences have been known to 
carry both political and moral valence into their creation of 
conceptual and operation definitions for the objects of their 
interest. For example, Jonathan Haidt, a developmental 
psychologist, and Paul Zak, a neuroeconomist, both trace 
their intellectual heritage to Hume’s theory of moral 
sentiment; thus they carry with them into their conceptual 
and operational definitions, as well as their experimental 
models, a certain kind of moral valence. 
Of course, there has been a long history of attempting to 
understand moral behavior through the lens of psychiatry 
or neurobiology. In fact, immoral behavior seems to have 
been defined conceptually as antisocial behavior, and 
antisocial behavior seems to have been operationalized 
along the lines of psychiatrically grounded tests for 
impulsivity, sociopathy, and psychopathy. Thus, we find 
studies like those of Meyer-Lindenberg et al., who claims 
to have found the missing link between the genome and 
the behavior in the neural substrates of brain structure and 
function. On the positive end of morality, Meeks and Jeste 
conceptualize wisdom, in part, as prosocial attitudes and 
behaviors, and attempt to reinterpret multiple genomic 
and neurotransmitter studies, attempting to find the gene 
and neurotransmitters that mediate prosocial attitudes and 
behaviors. They also reinterpret brain studies, attempting 
to locate various prosocial behaviors in various regions of 
the brain. 
When the psychological and social scientists bring their 
sciences into conversation with studies that examine 
genome and neurotransmitter activity, or into conversation 
with studies of fMRI and PET scanning, those same biases 
are then mapped onto the genome and the brains of 
people. 
When this science is popularized, for example, in the work of 
Sam Harris or Adrian Raine, we see a neuroscience become 
a “science” very much like that of phrenology, where— 
instead of cranial measurements—brain activity becomes 
a predictor of antisocial behavior, and the hope of doing 
good with science enters into the popular imagination. 
Thinking about Disability via Agency and 
Human Rights 
Michael Boylan 
MARYMOUNT UNIVERSITY 
Epitome: One important hurdle in properly thinking about 
disability is our very great bias toward homogeneity. What 
is different is bad; it’s abnormal. If human nature is best 
described as individuals seeking to commit purposive 
action to achieve his or her aims that s/he believes are 
good, then this opens a door of re-thinking the conceptual 
paradigm regarding disability. 
Key Words: Disability, human rights, negative/positive 
liberty, health, self-fulfillment 
Like snowflakes falling from the sky, each of us is unique 
in our place on this earth. Even identical twins are unique.1 
So what does it mean to be “unique”? It means that we are 
one-of-a-kind—though not sui generis. The “kind” is homo 
sapiens. But we are all singularly different. What are we to 
make of this difference? Is it a mere fact? Can some facts 
entail value? Can some values entail rights and duties? 
These are just a few of the central questions concerning 
public policy and disability. 
CENTRAL DEFINITIONS 
To begin our quest we must sort out the background 
conditions for comparison. This involves a journey into 
systematics and physiology. In systematics, various 
biological taxa are identified via anatomy and the 
corresponding physiology.2 There is always variation within 
each taxon. This is a dogma of evolutionary biology which 
this author accepts.3 
The way that anatomical organs, bones, and systems interact 
is physiology. This is viewed on the same scale: How can 
the various body parts work together so that the individual 
can perform the actions that he or she wants to perform? 
For simplicity let us call this the successful purposive agent.
From my perspective this is a firm statement of human 
nature: We all desire to be able purposively to act toward 
ends that we believe to be good. 
If we accept this characterization of human nature, then 
what follows from this? I contend that there is a hierarchical 
set of goods to which we all aspire and which can be 
judged according to how proximate these ends are to the 
possibility of purposive action.4 Thus any person on earth 
has a positive rights claim to these in descending order (the 
level-one basic goods trump all other claims, and so forth). 
I base this rights claim in what it would take to understand 
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one’s humanity as a prospective purposive agent, and 
what it would take to get there. I call this argument “The 
Moral Status of Basic Goods,”5 discussed at more length 
elsewhere.6 
When there are impediments to some particular individual 
possessing these goods—basic goods (levels one and 
two) and secondary goods (level one)—then it is the duty 
of all other people to provide these goods to those without 
them.7 For example, take food. The United Nations has set 
out that the minimum calorie intake on a regular basis is 
500 (given some variation for soma type).8 Seven hundred 
fifty calories is better and 1,000 calories is the aspirational 
goal. These nutritional needs allow the brain to operate 
in such a way that purposive action toward that which we 
consider to be good is possible. 
There are many reasons why some individual may not be 
successful at garnering level-one, level-two basic goods, 
and level-one secondary goods. These generally include 
socio-economic deprivation, a position in the community 
such that one’s ability to commit purposive action toward 
one’s conception of the good is restricted. One may be born 
into this state or descend there due to factors both within 
and not within one’s power. This essay will understand the 
word disability to refer to just such a state, one in which 
one faces a negative liberty road block or does not have 
the positive liberty to be able effectively to seek after those 
goods. 
Positive liberty will be taken to be the power one possesses 
to be able to effect purposive action that leads towards 
the ends that one believes are good (both prudentially and 
morally). The power is demonstrated in the activity of the 
agent as she seeks to move in the direction of realizing the 
desired end.9 
Negative liberty will be taken to refer to barriers from either 
within the agent or without that prevents the agent from 
fulfilling what he desires to do. Examples of “within the 
agent” include physiological impairments either mental, 
emotional, or in the operation of one’s muscular/skeletal 
system and its support systems.10 Examples of “without” 
include environmental restraints either natural or social/ 
political. For example, if one were born with the ability to 
concentrate for a long period of time before acting, this 
might be an advantage if one were born into a hunting 
society where one had to have the patience to wait for game 
before making his move. However, if one were a Wall Street 
broker, that same characteristic would mean that you might 
be always short on the one critical trade for your clients. 
Is being deliberate and patient, by nature, an advantage 
or a disability? It all depends upon the environment and 
whether it rewards or creates barriers for action. 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISABILITY 
At the end of the last section the suggestive notion was 
raised about disability being environmentally as well as 
intrinsically focused. The famous experiment of Kettlewell 
underscores this.11 The experiment goes like this. Take 
a region, e.g., an industrial region in northern England 
where factories have been spewing out soot for years. This 
soot lands on forests and changes the normal variegated 
color setting of an un-altered forest into one that is now 
predominately black. Living in this ecosystem are two 
subspecies of moth: one sub-speciesa has variegated wing 
color, and the other sub-speciesb has black wing color. In 
Environment1 the trees that constitute the habitat before 
pollution, the moths whose wing coloring is variegated 
dominated in population (meaning could avoid predators 
and successfully reproduce). In Environment2 pollution has 
made the trees black with soot and so the normal patterns 
changed. 
Kettlewell noticed that the normally populous sub-speciesa 
[in Envirionment1] were giving way to sub-speciesb. This 
was due to industrial pollution [creating Environment2]. By 
cleaning the trees, Kettlewell was able to reverse the trend 
(making sub-speciesa more populous again by re-creating 
Environment1). 
Does this mean that sub-speciesa is better than sub­
speciesb? Certainly not. For in Environment2, sub-speciesb 
flourished and dominated sub-speciesa. All that it shows 
is that no traits are “good” or “bad” per se, but are only so 
within certain environments. 
Another example is the gene that expresses sickle 
hemoglobin. Hemoglobin is the oxygen carrying protein in 
red cells, and a specific mutation in the beta polypeptide 
chain of hemoglobin leads to sickle hemoglobin, so 
called because the erythrocytes assume a sickle shape 
in conditions of low oxygen. Not only are such cells more 
rapidly cleared from the circulation than normal cells, 
leading to sickle cell anemia, but especially in individuals 
who are homozygous for the gene, such sickle cells can 
aggregate, block blood vessels and organs, and lead 
to the extremely painful and life-threatening sickle cell 
crisis. However, having erythrocytes that contain the sickle 
hemoglobin in an environment that contains malaria are 
beneficial. When such cells are infected with malaria, 
the red cells sickle and the parasites die. In addition, 
the parasite proteins are released to the circulation and 
the body can mount an immune response and abort the 
infection before full-blown malaria ensues. Thus, although 
being homozygous for sickle hemoglobin is deleterious, in 
an environment in which there is malaria, those who are 
heterozygous for the sickle hemoglobin gene will have a 
selective advantage, and be superior reproducers to those 
without the gene. However, in an environment in which 
there is no malaria, the sickle hemoglobin gene will make 
those that have it less fit for reproduction. Thus genetic 
fitness is seen to be a function of a particular gene in a 
particular environment. 
From the perspective of philosophy, phenotypic and 
genotypic traits are not “good” or “bad.” They simply “are.” 
Variation in any species is a dogmatic given. This is what 
allows the species to survive in changing environments. 
In each case there is no real “good” or “bad” with these 
cases of environmental disability. It is merely a term 
that is environmentally relative. However, in human 
cases this environmental factor can also be the source 
of unjust discrimination.12 What makes this case unjust 
is that preferment for the more desired positions in 
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the community often go to those with undeserved 
background qualifications, as judged by work performed 
by the individual herself—as opposed to privilege given 
by birth. These so called “accidents of birth” or “accidents 
of circumstance” are not deserved. For example, when I 
submitted the manuscript for my first novel, Far Into the 
Sound, it went directly to the publisher rather than going 
through an agent. This was called the slush pile. Well, 
this hard-working editor was going through the slush pile 
one day and then stopped and decided to go to lunch to 
meet her boyfriend. My manuscript was at the top of the 
pile when she left for lunch. At the luncheon the editor’s 
boyfriend asked her to marry him, a proposition that the 
editor greeted positively. When she got back to the office I 
was at the top of the slush pile. Guess what? She liked my 
novel and published it. 
Did I deserve this good fortune? No. It was out of my control. 
It is very possible that several manuscripts better than my 
own were turned down in the morning because the editor 
might have been in a depressed mood. She looked at my 
manuscript in an “up” mood. I gained at the expense of 
other manuscripts that may have been superior. 
This is what I am talking about in external environmental 
factors that can make a positive or negative impact. No 
environmental factor is “deserved.” When people’s ability 
to act is accentuated or diminished due to environmental 
factors that are not within their control, then properly there 
is no praise or blame involved.13 
However, we all know that the world does not revolve 
around “properly.” This is the battle that ethics faces with 
prudential factors. One example that I have cited in the past 
illustrates this paradox in the contrast between positive 
and negative undeserved environmental factors.14 For 
example, say there are two individuals: Mr. A and Ms. B. Mr. 
A comes from a very affluent, well-connected background 
that is rewarded by the mainstream society. Ms. B comes 
from a poor, discriminated-against background that the 
mainstream society subjects to unwarranted prejudice. 
Mr. A’s position entering life is to be en-abled while Ms. B 
is dis-abled. Neither individual’s competitive status in the 
game of life is fair. Mr. A gets his enabled advantage via an 
accident of birth; Ms. B’s disadvantage comes about also 
via an accident of birth. Thus, if this is a proper paradigm 
of much of life on earth, then many who are enabled or 
disabled due to environmental factors are not to be praised 
or blamed because those factors are out of their power.15 
DISABILITY AND STIGMA 
Thus disability can occur from factors within the agent 
or from without the agent. In the former case it is either 
by genetics (not under the agent’s control) or accidents 
peculiar to the agent (whether they are under the control of 
the agent or not).16 Let us call this sort of disability clinical, 
individualized disability. It refers to conditions that confront 
the agent herself in her own personal history. For example, 
a person may be born with severe curvature of the spine or 
suffer from a car accident that limits one’s ability to commit 
various sorts of purposive action. In the popular press, 
most discussion of disability refers to these sorts of cases. 
In the latter instance, the disability arises from environmental 
factors that are out of the control of the agent. This can be 
termed public health disability, which affects a population 
differentially. For example, the Love Canal case involved 
the leakage of toxic chemicals that made its way into the 
public drinking water so that the citizens of Love Canal (a 
neighborhood in Niagara Falls, New York) were severely 
affected.17 Many were hurt, from children with seizures to 
adults with cancer. The story here is general with particular 
people reacting in various ways—some were harmed more 
than others. 
In each case disability occurs. Disability incurs stigma. 
Whether a person was disabled due to his own behavior— 
such as emphysema from smoking—or not—such as a 
genetic disorder, accident or falling prey to a public health 
disaster—there is stigma. This is because most community 
worldviews18 pretend to a self-description of happiness 
and prosperity. Even countries that have regular mass 
starvation, such as North Korea, create songs and public 
art that present the vision of everything being happy and 
wonderful.19 Disability (however caused) gets in the way of 
this fairy tale. 
Stigma is a social term that increases the pain and suffering 
of the affected individuals and a fortiori further diminishes 
the capability for action. This is because social recognition 
of a disabled person as the other puts them into the 
stream of double consciousness, which restricts effective 
action.20 When one becomes the other, then he is saddled 
with a double consciousness that further inhibits effective 
purposive action.21 In double consciousness one acquires 
two identities: the agent as he sees himself from his inner 
consciousness (what I call personal worldview)22 and a 
second identity, which is that of the disabled individual. 
This second consciousness comes to play in every life 
action and can sometimes affect the way one reacts in 
life. Because another factor is brought into the picture, 
purposive action becomes more complicated (and a fortiori 
less effective). 
Two examples of this from the interior and exterior vantage 
points can be set out as follows: Interior: The agent has 
trouble doing stairs because of damage to his knees. He is 
always keen on knowing beforehand (if possible) whether 
there are a lot of stairs and whether there is a handrail to 
help him navigate the stairs. If he is in a chair or walker, he 
needs to know whether there is an elevator. This applies to 
almost every locomotion decision that he makes beyond 
his immediate dwelling. Exterior: Say I am an African 
American living in the United States. When I go outside 
my dwelling by foot or in a motorized vehicle I must be 
wary of police and skinheads. (Skinheads are racists of 
European descent who try to make life difficult for African 
Americans and others who are different from themselves.) 
There is no justifiable reason for the loathing of the other. I 
have speculated about this before, but there may be strong 
strains of desire for homogeneity that is behind this.23 This 
is a vain telos. Racial homogeneity (sometimes called 
“purity”)24 is itself a vehicle of disability, as we have seen in 
so-called genetic drift populations.25 
PAGE 16 SPRING 2015 | VOLUME 14  | NUMBER 2 
APA NEWSLETTER  |  PHILOSOPHY AND MEDICINE
 
 
 
 
There is no objective value to general exterior judgments 
that confer disability. As we saw in the Kettlewell experiment 
environments, physical characteristics such as race are 
random, and various genotypes perform differentially in 
these different settings. It is not a value judgment on this 
level, but merely a fact about one individual in her uniqueness 
within a given set of circumstances.26 Therefore, those who 
discriminate against those with interior or exterior disability 
are engaged in a logical inconsistency. And as per Kant, all 
consciously held logical inconsistencies are flawed.27 I also 
characterize such logical inconsistencies as failures in the 
personal worldview imperative.28 In either case, those who 
freely discriminate against those disabled from within or 
without are ethically flawed and should alter their personal 
worldviews. 
This and the previous section have sought to set out that 
difference (whether from interior or exterior factors) is only 
functionally related to purposive action. It is not bad. But 
socially, many communities around the world understand 
physical, mental, or emotional difference as a tag of being 
bad. It does not have to be this way. In the ancient world, 
epilepsy began as being viewed as sacred (as per Cassandra 
in the Iliad, XIII, 366; XXIV, 690) and then took on a double 
meaning with the early Hippocratic writers (The Sacred 
Disease).29 Why should we assume that this difference is 
inherently good or bad? It is a fact that according to the 
situation may be functionally useful or not. But there is 
nothing per se good or bad about variations in anatomy or 
physiology. They just are. 
HOW WE SHOULD REGARD THE DISABLED?
The first thing that is of utmost importance is the attitude 
that many in most societies take on: if one is disabled 
in one area of his physiology, then he is to be viewed as 
totally without the capacity for positive action. I call this 
attitude the Disability Fallacy. Employers seeing a person 
who cannot walk quickly or do stairs believes them to 
be fully incapable. Other individuals who have autism or 
Asperger’s Syndrome are thought to be fit only for not 
good work. The disability fallacy is illogical. Since disability 
is anatomically or physiologically localized and depends 
upon environment, other powers of the individual must 
be viewed separately. Of course, a well-known example 
of this is Stephen Hawking. He suffers from amyotrophic 
lateral sclerosis (ALS) and yet he has made some of the 
most important contributions to cosmology in the past 
thirty years. His mind is brilliant though his body faces 
challenges in normal daily tasks. Hawking is an example of 
why we should all resist the disability fallacy. 
Another issue that frequently arises in how we view the 
disabled is fault. This author has taken the stance that one 
should not speculate on how one has become disabled. 
This is irrelevant to the argument on the moral status of 
basic goods and the table of embeddedness. This argument 
and its interpretation via the table of embeddedness 
create positive rights that all people possess.30 It does 
not stipulate how one became incapacitated. One has a 
proportional right according to the level of embeddedness 
to all goods on the table. Since goods entail duties, it is 
the duty of everyone on earth to provide access to these 
goods, subject only to the caveat of “ought implies can.” 
A secondary justification for providing the disabled access 
to the goods included on the table of embeddedness 
comes from the personhood account within my theory 
of human rights.31 This comes from the personal 
worldview imperative: “All people must develop a single 
comprehensive and internally coherent worldview that 
is good and that we strive to act out in our daily lives.” 
There are four parts to this personal worldview imperative: 
completeness, coherence, connection to a theory of the 
good, and practicality. Let’s briefly say something about 
each. 
First is completeness. Completeness refers to the ability of 
a theory or ethical system to handle all cases put before 
it and to determine an answer based upon the system’s 
recommendations. This is functionally achieved via the good 
will. The good will is a mechanism by which we decide how 
to act in the world. The good will provides completeness to 
everyone who develops one. There are two senses of the 
good will. The first is the rational good will, which means 
that each agent will develop an understanding about what 
reason requires of us as we go about our business in the 
world. Completeness means that reason (governed by the 
personal worldview and its operational ethical standpoint) 
should always be able to come up with an answer to a 
difficult life decision. In the case of ethics, the rational good 
will requires engaging in a rationally based philosophical 
ethics and abiding by what reason demands. Often this 
plays out practically in examining and justifying various 
moral maxims, such as, “one has a moral responsibility to 
follow-through on one’s commitments, ceteris paribus.” 
This maxim is about promise making—call it maxim alpha. 
For example, one could imagine that an employer named 
Fred hired Olga on the basis of her résumé and a Skype 
interview, which did not reveal her mobility challenges (she 
needs a walker to get from points A to B for perambulation). 
Fred promises Olga the job, but when she shows up to 
work Fred determines that Olga does not fit the image of 
the company that he wishes to exude: vibrant, athletic, and 
potent. A person in a walker is discordant to this image. 
Even though the job is a desk job (sitting in a cubicle), Fred 
wants to fire Olga. What should Fred do? The rational good 
will (as Fred, himself, has developed it via maxim alpha) says 
that Fred should carry through with his promise to Olga, 
since there is no conflicting moral issue that would invoke 
the ceteris paribus clause in the maxim. For Fred to act 
otherwise would be an instance of denying completeness 
based upon the rational good will. Fred should keep his 
promise to Olga and let her work for him. 
Another sort of goodwill is the affective or emotional good 
will. We are more than just rational machines. We have an 
affective nature, too. Our feelings are important, but just as 
was the case with reason, some guidelines are in order. For 
the emotional good will we begin with sympathy. Sympathy 
will be taken to be the emotional connection that one forms 
with other humans. This emotional connection must be one 
in which the parties are considered to be on a level basis. 
The sort of emotional connection I am talking about is open 
and between equals. It is not that of a superior “feeling 
sorry” for an inferior. Those who engage in interactive 
human sympathy that is open and level will respond to 
another with care. Care is an action-guiding response 
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that gives moral motivation to assisting another in need. 
Together, sympathy, openness, and care constitute love. 
In the above case on promise-making, Fred wouldn’t be 
engaging in making and justifying moral maxims such 
as maxim-alpha. Instead, Fred would be developing his 
capacity sympathetically to connect with other people— 
call this maxim-beta. If Fred sympathetically connected 
with Olga and a disability that has nothing to do with her 
ability to carry out the job as advertised, his caring response 
would guide him toward maintaining his promise to Olga 
because to do otherwise would sever the sympathetic 
connection. Fred would not be acting like a loving person to 
do otherwise. The shared community worldview of vibrant, 
athletic, and potent need not be compromised because 
these are basically characteristics of the human spirit and 
not of the physical body. Olga can do her desk job with a 
joie de vivre that reflects the company’s shared community 
worldview. Thus, Fred acting on maxim-beta should refrain 
from firing Olga. 
Thus, the two sorts of good will (affective and rational—set 
out via maxims alpha and beta) work together to promote 
keeping Olga on the job so long as she can do the work— 
disability should not be a factor here.32 
When confronted with any novel situation one should 
utilize the two dimensions of the good will to generate a 
response. Because these two orientations act differently, it 
is possible that they may contradict each other. When this 
is the case, I would allot the tiebreaker to reason. Others 
demur.33 Each reader should consider her own response to 
such an occurrence. 
A second part of the personal worldview imperative is 
coherence. People should have coherent worldviews. This 
also has two varieties: deductive and inductive. Deductive 
coherence speaks to our not having overt contradictions in 
our worldview. An example of an overt contradiction in one’s 
worldview would be for Sasha to tell her friend Sharad that 
she has no prejudice against disabled individuals while in 
another context she tells jokes about disabled persons. The 
coherence provision of the personal worldview imperative 
says that you shouldn’t change who you are and what you 
stand for depending upon the context in which you happen 
to be: you should either support people with disabilities 
or excoriate them. Waffling between the two is incoherent. 
Inductive coherence is different. It is about adopting 
different life strategies that work against each other. In 
inductive logic a conflicting strategy is called a sure-
loss contract.34 For example, if a person wanted to be a 
devoted husband and family man and yet also engaged in 
extramarital affairs, he would involve himself in inductive 
incoherence. The very traits that make him a good family 
man: loyalty, keeping your word, sincere interest in the well­
being of others—would impede one in being a philanderer, 
which requires selfish manipulation of others for one’s own 
pleasure. The good family man will be a bad philanderer, 
and vice versa. To try to do both well involves a sure-loss 
contract. Such an individual will fail at both. This is what 
inductive incoherence means. From the point of view of a 
disabled person, this second form of coherence involves a 
self-assessment of what can and cannot be done: to seek 
for both will lead to a sure-loss contract. This creates a 
reality of the possible in which the disabled person can try 
to find self-fulfillment (see below under health). 
Third is connection to a theory of the good—the most 
prominent being ethics. 35 The personal worldview 
imperative enjoins that we consider and adopt an ethical 
theory.36 It does not give us direction, as such, to which 
theory to choose, except that the chosen theory must not 
violate any of the other three conditions of completeness, 
coherence, and practicability. What is demanded is that we 
connect to a theory of ethics and use it to guide our actions. 
The final criterion is practicability. It is important that the 
demands of ethics and social/political philosophy (including 
human rights) be doable and its goals be attainable. This 
is especially important to consider when one is disabled. 
One must accept the body one is in at the moment and 
consider what is possible for it. This does not mean to 
“settle” for something less. But it also does not mean that 
one should hang upon scientifically unwarranted dreams 
of having one’s disability reversed. A utopian command 
may have logically valid arguments behind it but also be 
existentially unsound—meaning that some of the premises 
in the action-guiding argument are untrue by virtue of 
their being unrealizable in practical terms. If, in a theory 
of global ethics, for example, we required that everyone 
in a rich country give up three-quarters of their income so 
that they might support the legitimate plight of the poor, 
then this would be a utopian vision. Philosophers are all too 
often attracted to tidy, if perhaps radical, utopian visions. 
However, unless philosophers want to be marginalized, we 
must formulate our prescriptions in terms that can actually 
be used by policymakers. Philosophers involved in human 
rights discourse must remember that these theories are to 
apply to real people living in the world. In taxation policy, 
for example, at some point—let’s say at the point of a 50 
percent income-tax rate—even the very wealthy among 
us will feel unjustly burdened and will rebel and refuse to 
comply with the policy. Thus, it is utopian to base a policy 
upon the expectation that the rich will submit to giving 
up 75 percent of their income. An aspirational goal (by 
contrast) is one that may be hard to reach but is at least 
possible to achieve; it does not violate principles of human 
nature or structural facts about the communities that inhabit 
the world. For the purposes of this essay, an aspirational 
perspective will be chosen over the utopian. 
The purview of the personal worldview imperative is the 
individual as she interacts with other individuals in the 
world. Each of us has to do as much as possible to take 
stock of who we are and what we realistically think we 
can and should be. Our personal consciousness is our 
power to change what is within our power. Though factors 
of environment and genetics are not to be dismissed, in 
the end it is the free operation of our will that allows us to 
confront the personal worldview imperative as a challenge 
for personal renewal. The acceptance of the personal 
worldview account means that it is in our power to create 
our ethical selves. The personal worldview imperative thus 
grounds my theory of personhood, part of the foundation 
of natural human rights of which disability rights is a subset. 
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Thus, there are two ways to justify public policy that 
supports the rights of the disabled: (a) rationally based 
arguments on rights, and (b) a personhood account that 
seeks to integrate rational and emotive dispositions in an 
integrated good will that dictates people improve upon 
empathy that can open the opportunity for level-sympathy, 
care, and action, all of which constitute love. 
DISABILITY, HEALTH, AND SELF-FULLMENT 
In the second edition of my text on Medical Ethics, I bring 
together three philosophers (Rosemarie Tong, Anita Silvers, 
and myself) to write about health.37 Medicine’s mission is 
to advance health. Disability is connected to health. If we 
don’t know what health is, then medicine is lost without 
a map, and we have no ground to judge the etiology 
of disability. In all three of these essays there are a few 
common answers to the problem that are in some ways 
useful, but certainly not comprehensive. For example, is 
being healthy to be at the median within some reference 
class? Certainly this is the way medical test results are 
often presented to the patient. However, there are certainly 
instances when being far away from the median is thought 
to be a desirable condition—such as being smart, or being 
athletically gifted, or being artistically talented. Perhaps 
there is more to the story? These essays seek to explore 
this question. 
Rosemarie Tong’s point of focus is upon infertility— 
especially female infertility. Sometimes infertility is seen 
as a disability in which there are potential positive liberty 
options. Now healthcare delivery can be seen from at 
least two critical vantage points: clinical medicine that 
focuses upon a particular patient seeing her particular 
doctor about a particular problem and public health 
medicine that focuses upon groups of people sharing a 
particular condition that either is itself unhealthy or is a 
stepping stone to a chronic or fatal disease. For example, 
smoking and obesity among the general population lead 
to more respiratory diseases and lung cancer (the former) 
and diabetes along with muscular skeletal disorders (the 
latter). Using this bifurcated approach, Tong examines how 
infertility can be addressed. The clinical approach looks 
at how IVF treatment performs as an answer along with 
freezing female eggs before age thirty-five so that they are 
more viable.38 
Under the public health approach, various diseases (such 
as chlamydia) need to be routinely checked and treated 
to keep women’s reproductive tracts in the best possible 
condition. Also, there are exposures to chemicals in the 
workplace, etc. Tong makes a strong case for treating 
infertility first as a public health problem and then as a 
clinical treatment in order to promote positive liberty and 
impede negative liberty. 
In Anita Silvers’s essay, the issue of health among the 
elderly is examined. Being old is often viewed by society 
as a disability. This is certainly an important segment of 
the population to look at because elderly people go to 
the doctor more often and have higher medical expenses. 
Silvers asks the question of whether old people should be 
thought of as “greedy geezers.” This perception can come 
about in the United States because Medicare (the social 
service medical plan that covers most of the elderly in 
this country) is funded by young people through payroll 
taxes. But Silvers argues against this charge. People are 
living longer lives and must adjust what they expect to be 
able to do. This is important for the personal worldviews of 
those who may have specific impairments as they age. The 
healthcare community must also adjust their expectations 
about what is healthy among the elderly. Without this 
adjustment, it might very well be the case that care may be 
denied “because those relying on prosthetics and mobility 
devices to locomote is not considered to be healthy 
enough.” Silvers highlights some key issues in clinical 
medicine and healthcare policy. If we accept Silvers’s 
argument, then what might be a disability in a person of 
twenty, like limitations on mobility—stair walking, needing 
a cane, etc.—might not be considered a disability in 
someone who is eighty-five. This does return us to the 
concept of a reference class for a limited application (in 
a different sense from above) regarding lab tests that are 
applied to all ages equally. 
Finally, in the last essay of this trio, I set out various 
ways of understanding health: functional approaches 
(objectivism, uncompromised life-span, and functionalism/ 
dysfuctionalism). All three are shown to provide several key 
insights to health but are not sufficient to ground a general 
theory. Next, I examine the public health approach. Like Tong, 
I am very interested in this approach, especially because 
of its ability to be translated into coherent public policy. 
Finally, there are subjectivist approaches to health. Many 
of the subjectivist theories concentrate upon well-being. 
However, there are some difficulties here. For this reason, I 
advocate for a self-fulfillment approach that is evaluated by 
an independent measure (to avoid the circularity problems 
of the well-being approach). The independent measure 
involves a particular understanding of personal worldview. 
It is my contention that though all the aforesaid approaches 
to understanding health have merit, the strongest overall 
is the self-fulfillment approach that centers around making 
progress toward what the individual considers to be good 
in life. Unlike various zero-sum analyses of life where there 
can only be a few winners, the self-fulfillment approach 
allows everyone to be a winner.39 
ELIMINATING NEGATIVE LIBERTY AND
ENHANCING POSITIVE LIBERTY 
Ultimately, public policy approaches require two poles: 
elimination of negative liberty impediments and the 
creation of positive liberty capability programs that will 
assist the disabled to live a healthy life (as defined above) 
in which they can pursue their vision of the good. This was 
briefly touched upon in the last section concerning health. 
Negative liberty concerns the impediments that face a 
person with a disability so they cannot perform in a setting 
for which they are entirely capable. One of the most common 
of these accommodations is the presence of elevators on 
public transport.40 Another common negative liberty hurdle 
is the imposition of health requirements for employment. 
For example, people with certain diseases (like HIV) have 
often been discriminated against, partly because of an 
unscientific understanding of how the disease spreads, 
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and partly because of homophobic worldviews. Today, any 
travel to West Africa carries the same sort of stigma due 
to the Ebola epidemic. Often, employers create barriers 
where they need not be. 
Then there are the barriers for governmental services—such 
as voting booths, governmental building design, access 
to communication devices for the hearing and visually 
impaired, access to public recreation facilities (especially 
pools), or availability of service animals such as seeing eye 
dogs. 
Concerning positive liberty (creating opportunities where 
they might not presently exist), there is the perspective of 
the present and the perspective of the future. Concerning 
the present, various accommodations that do exist can 
(and should) be publicized to the general public within a 
given municipality. Also, the use of new technology needs 
to be integrated into the workplace. For example, there 
are modern computers that can be operated without the 
use of hands. This can be a boon to the paraplegic and 
quadriplegic and can change the nature of so-called white 
collar jobs. Modern technology that exists right now can be 
applied to a variety of situations to promote positive liberty. 
For the future, it is important for public policy to encourage 
scientific research into the causes and treatments of 
birth defects, diseases, and severe accidents. Genetic 
engineering promises to be a very big player in the future 
in expanding positive liberty among the disabled.41 
SUPPORT OF COMMUNITIES 
In a practical way, no public legislation will allow a disabled 
individual to create a personal life plan that is realistic 
within the scope of the disability without the support of 
the community. This means a commitment in the shared 
community worldview. Community worldviews are viewed 
variously around the world. My conception of a functioning 
moral community worldview is one that embraces diversity, 
subject to the personal worldview imperative.42 It requires 
participation by all members of the community. Those who 
wish to reap the benefits of the community without making 
their proportional contribution will be deemed to be free 
riders (a community parasitism that arises from selfish­
egoism).43 
The reason that communities should support policies that 
eliminate negative liberty obstacles and support positive 
liberty enhancements is because of the characterization 
of the rational and emotional good will as set out above. 
Rationally set out duties as per “The Moral Right to Basic 
Goods” and the Table of Embeddedness ground a logical 
positive right/duty. Emotionally, level sympathy that leads 
to care (love) dictates no other response. 
Community support at the ground level, as manifested 
in micro communities, is the essential practical piece 
to bringing about effective change. You cannot change 
a person’s heart with laws alone.44 The mechanics of 
community and personal worldview change require public 
leaders to come forward to generate overlap with the status 
quo with some vision of what can be. I call this process 
“The Way We Confront Novel Normative Theories.”45 
CONCLUSION
Though the ancient Greeks honored those with disabilities 
as being “touched by the gods”—like Cassandra in the 
Iliad—modern societies in their competitive worldviews 
have often treated the disabled with cruelty. In this essay I 
have tried to set out a shared community worldview in which 
this will change. By eliminating negative liberty barriers 
and by investing in the science/engineering that will help 
extend positive liberty, we (as societies in the world) can 
extend the range of human agency for all people—which is 
their basic human right.46 
NOTES 
1.	 This is a tortured question. On the identical twin angle, see Susan 
L. Farber, Identical Twins Raised Apart (New York: Basic Books, 
1981); and Niels Juel-Nielsen, Individual and Environment: 
Monozygotic Twins Raised Apart (New York: International 
University Press, 1980). For two more narrow analytic approaches, 
see Jay Joseph, “The Equal Environment Assumption of the 
Classical Twin Methods: A Critical Analysis,” Journal of Mind and 
Behavior 9, no. 3 (1998): 325–58; and Joseph Owens, “Semantic 
Comprehension, Inference, and Psychological Externalism,” 
Mind and Language 28, no. 2 (2013): 173–203. 
2.	 I discuss this issue in the context of ancient philosophy of 
science in two books: Method and Practice in Aristotle’s Biology 
(New York: UPA/Rowman and Littlefield, 1983), and The Origin 
of Ancient Greek Science: Blood, a Philosophical Study (London: 
Routledge, 2015). 
3.	 For an excellent outline on the basic tenets of evolutionary 
theory in biology and what it signifies, see Stephen Jay Gould, 
The Structure of Evolutionary Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2002). 
4.	 BASIC GOODS 
Level One: Most Deeply Embedded (that which is absolutely 
necessary for human action): food, water (including sanitation), 
clothing, shelter, protection from unwarranted bodily harm 
(including basic health care) 
Level Two: Deeply Embedded (that which is necessary for 
effective basic action within any given society) 
•	 Literacy in the language of the country 
•	 Basic mathematical skills 
•	 Other fundamental skills necessary to be an effective agent 
in that country (e.g., in the United States, some computer 
literacy is necessary) 
•	 Some familiarity with the culture and history of the country 
in which one lives 
•	 The assurance that those you interact with are not lying to 
promote their own interests 
•	 The assurance that those you interact with will recognize 
your human dignity (as per above) and not exploit you as a 
means only 
•	 Basic human rights such as those listed in the U.S. Bill of 
Rights and the United Nations Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights 
SECONDARY GOODS 
Level One: Life Enhancing, Medium to High-Medium on 
Embeddedness 
•	 Basic societal respect 
•	 Equal opportunity to compete for the prudential goods of 
society 
•	 Ability to pursue a life plan according to the Personal 
Worldview Imperative 
•	 Ability to participate equally as an agent in the Shared 
Community Worldview Imperative 
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Level Two: Useful, Medium to Low-Medium Embeddedness 
•	 Ability to utilize one’s real and portable property in the 
manner she chooses 
•	 Ability to gain from and exploit the consequences of one’s 
labor, regardless of starting point 
•	 Ability to pursue goods that are generally owned by most 
citizens (e.g., in the United States today, a telephone, 
television, and automobile would fit into this class) 
Level Three: Luxurious, Low Embeddedness 
•	 Ability to pursue goods that are pleasant even though they 
are far removed from action and from the expectations of 
most citizens within a given country (e.g., in the United 
States today, a European vacation would fit into this class) 
•	 Ability to exert one’s will so that she might extract a 
disproportionate share of society’s resources for her own use 
5.	 “The Moral Status of Basic Goods” 
1.	 All people, by nature, desire to be good—Fundamental 
Assumption 
2.	 In order to become good, one must be able to act—Fact 
3.	 All people, by nature, desire to act—1, 2 
4.	 People value what is natural to them—Assertion 
5.	 What people value they wish to protect—Assertion 
6.	 All people wish to protect their ability to act—3-5 
7.	 Fundamental interpersonal “oughts” are expressed via our 
highest value systems: morality, aesthetics, and religion— 
Assertion 
8.	 All people must agree, upon pain of logical contradiction, that 
what is natural and desirable to them individually is natural 
and desirable to everyone, collectively and individually— 
Assertion 
9.	 Everyone must seek personal protection for her own ability 
to act via morality, aesthetics, and religion—6, 7 
10. Everyone, upon pain of logical contradiction, must admit that 
all other humans will seek personal protection of his or her 
ability to act via morality, aesthetics, and religion—8, 9 
11.	 All people must agree, upon pain of logical contradiction, 
that since the attribution of the basic goods of agency are 
predicated generally, it is inconsistent to assert idiosyncratic 
preference—Fact 
12. Goods that are claimed through generic predication apply 
equally to each agent, and everyone has a stake in their 
protection—10, 11 
13. Rights and duties are correlative—Assertion 
14. Everyone has at least a moral right to the basic goods of 
agency, and others in the society have a duty to provide 
those goods to all—12, 13 
6.	 Michael Boylan, Natural Human Rights: A Theory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), ch. 6; and A Just Society 
(Lanham, MD and New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), ch. 3. 
7.	 Levels two and three of secondary goods are to be considered 
after the more embedded levels have been realized. 
8.	 The 2007 Human Development Report (New York: United Nations 
Development Program, 2007), 27. 
9.	 Many of the key distinctions I draw on liberty can be found in 
Isiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1969). 
10. By support systems, I am referring to the major systems of the 
body, such as the circulatory, nervous, and digestive systems. 
These systems allow the conditions for voluntary positive liberty. 
11.	 H. B. D. Kettlewell, “Industrial Melanism in Moths,” in Man’s 
Impact on the Environment, ed. Thomas Detwyler (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1971). 
12. For discussion of unjust discrimination, see my example of the 
puzzle-maker in Boylan, A Just Society, 139–45; and Boylan, 
Natural Human Rights, ch. 6. 
13.	 Aristotle makes this point in EN Book 3, Chapter 1, 1109b 30­
1111a 20–24. 
14. Boylan, Natural Human Rights, 187–93. 
15.	 I say that desert only follows from what one does himself, 
stripping out the influence of environmental factors: Boylan, A 
Just Society, 138–45; Boylan, Natural Human Rights, 187–92. 
16. Some would make a distinction here. For example, say you were 
crippled as the result of a car accident caused by a drunken 
driver who ran over into your lane and hit you. This would be an 
example of an injury not in one’s control. However, if you were 
the drunken driver, you might also be crippled, but the cause of 
the accident was in your control. This can be a critical distinction 
concerning “blame” and “desert,” but with respect to public 
policy, it would be impossible to make this distinction. See Brian 
Smart, “Fault and the Allocation of Spare Organs,” in Medical 
Ethics, 2nd ed., ed. Michael Boylan (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2014), 305–12. 
17.	 Lois Marie Gibbs, Love Canal and the Birth of the Environmental 
Health Movement (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2010). 
18. Boylan, A Just Society, 113–36. 
19.	 For a fictional account, see the Pulitzer Prize winning novel by 
Adam Johnson, The Orphan Master’s Son (New York: Random 
House, 2012). 
20. Michael Boylan, 	Morality and Global Justice: Justifications and 
Applications (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2011), 119–31. 
21.	 The originator of this viewpoint can be found in W. E. B. DuBois, 
The Souls of Black Folk (New York: Dover, 1994 [1903]). 
22. Boylan, A Just Society, 21–52; and Boylan, Natural Human Rights, 
163–70. 
23. Boylan, A Just Society, 85, 170, 187, 245. See my reply in ch. 5. 
24. An example of this can be found in the translated phrase “ethnic 
cleansing” that occurred in the 1990s upon the break-up of 
Yugoslavia. See Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, Ethnic Cleansing (New York: 
Palgrave-Macmillan, 1999). 
25.	 Benjamin A. Pierce, Genetics: A Conceptual Approach, 4th ed. 
(New York: W. H. Freeman, 2010), ch. 26. 
26. This should not be taken as any agreement on the propriety of 
the skinheads or any other of the various exterior public health 
environments, merely a factual description of what happens in 
the mechanics of environmental disability. 
27.	 See my discussion of Kant and the first and second forms of the 
categorical imperative in Basic Ethics, 2nd ed. (Upper Saddle 
River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2009), ch. 13. 
28. In my personal worldview imperative, one of the two major 
mandates is the rational good will, op. cit. 
29.	 “In my opinion, this disease is not more sacred than any other,” 
I,.i (my tr.) from Hippocrates vol. 2, ed. and trans. W. H. S. Jones 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press [Loeb], 1923). 
30. Of course, this is not absolute for ongoing problems. For 
example, if one were an alcoholic or a drug addict and needed 
a new liver, and there were a shortage of these within a cadre 
of claimants, then it would seem that unless there were a way 
to ensure that the claimant would not abuse this new organ, the 
scarce organ should be allocated to one who would not abuse 
the organ. This is not a statement against past actions, but a 
statement about the use progressively of organs transplanted 
from here on out. For a discussion of this, see Smart, op. cit. 
31. Boylan, Natural Human Rights, 163–70. 
32. Since the affective goodwill comes from the completeness 
condition of the Personal Worldview Imperative, the conditions 
of the imperative also apply to this sort of philosophical love that 
I have set out. Some detractors think that you cannot order love 
(as I have done). I give a response to this argument in Michael 
Boylan, “Duties to Children” in The Morality and Global Justice 
Reader, ed. Michael Boylan (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2011), 385– 
404. 
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33.	 This is particularly true of some feminist ethicists. See Rosemarie 
Tong, “A Feminist Personal Worldview Imperative,” in Morality 
and Justice: Reading Boylan’s A Just Society, ed. John-Stewart 
Gordon (Lanham, MD, and Oxford: Lexington/Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2009), 29–38. 
34. The phrase “sure loss contract” comes from the notion of betting 
houses. Say you were betting on the finals of the World Cup: 
Brazil v. Germany. If you gave 5-1 positive odds for each team, 
then your betting house would go out of business. A positive 
assessment of one team requires a complementary negative 
assessment of the other. Failure to observe this rule results in a 
sure loss contract. 
35.	 Other aspects of the good can include commitments to aesthetics 
and to religion. 
36. My take on the various real and anti-real theories is generally 
set out in my text, Basic Ethics, 2nd ed., Part Two (Upper Saddle 
River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2009). 
37.	 Rosemarie Tong, “Ethics, Infertility, and Public Health: Balancing 
Public Good and Private Choice” [pp. 13–29]; Anita Silvers, “Too 
Old for the Good of Health?” [pp. 30–43]; Michael Boylan, “Health 
and Self-Fulfillment” [44–57], all in Michael Boylan, Medical 
Ethics, 2nd ed. (New York and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014). 
38. See my discussion with Tong on this subject: 	https://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=FsvQfujKbkg&noredirect=1. Accessed 
January 12, 2014. 
39.	 For a more complete exposition of this, see Michael Boylan, The 
Good, the True, and the Beautiful (London: Bloomsbury, 2008), 
45–64. 
40. For example, subway systems and buses should be accessible 
to those who cannot walk stairs. This is a real problem in large 
established public transportation systems around the world. 
41.	 Of course, there are ethical issues here as well. For an examination 
of some of these, see Michael Boylan and Kevin Brown, Genetic 
Engineering: Science and Ethics on the New Frontier (Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002). 
42. My version of the shared community worldview imperative is 
this: Each agent must contribute to a common body of knowledge 
that supports the creation of a shared community worldview (that 
is itself complete, coherent, and good) through which social 
institutions and their resulting policies might flourish within the 
constraints of the essential core commonly held values (ethics, 
aesthetics, and religion): Boylan, A Just Society, ch. 6. 
43.	 Of course, there are unapologetic advocates of selfish-egoism 
such as Ayn Rand, The Virtues of Selfishness (New York: Signet, 
1964); and conservative libertarians like Milton Friedman, 
Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1962), who only believe in negative duties. They are advocates 
of egg carton communities. 
44. For example, in the United States, there have been significant 
gaps between legislation and practical benefit in the case of 
racial civil rights. The 13th and 14th amendments, which were 
supposed to stop slavery and unequal treatment under the law, 
were a failure at the level where people lived. Racism, lynchings, 
and other forms of overt oppression continued. Then, a century 
later, the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act promised an 
end to this discrimination. However, though life on the ground 
improved, it is still the case that police profile, incarcerate, 
and injure (kill) African Americans at a rate far above those of 
European descent. See Terrance J. Taylor, David Holleran, and 
Volkan Topalli, “Racial Bias in Case Processing,” Justice Quarterly 
26, no. 3 (2009): 562–91; and Michael Boylan, “Ethical Profiling,” 
The Journal of Ethics 15 (January 2011): 131–45. 
45. Michael Boylan, Natural Human Rights, 206–13. 
46. I discuss what I consider to be the range of human rights claims 
in ibid. 
You Are Old, Father William (with 
apologies to Lewis Carroll) 
Felicia Nimue Ackerman 
BROWN UNIVERSITY 
Appeared in The Los Angeles Times, August 31, 2014. 
“You are old, Father William,” the young man said,
 
“And the money’s become very tight;
 
And yet you’ll spend anything not to be dead—
 
Do you think, at your age, it is right?”
 
“In my youth,” Father William replied to his son,
 
“I figured that old folks should die;
 
But now that I’m perfectly sure that I’m one,
 
I do not see a good reason why.”
 
“You are old,” said the son, “as I mentioned before.
 
So consider your grandson’s position,
 
Since the money that keeps you away from death’s door
 
Could be used for his college tuition.”
 
“I am old,” Father William replied in a yell,
 
“But I’ve not taken leave of my wits!
 
I should croak so young Willie can go to Cornell?
 
Be off, or I’ll blow you to bits!”
 
Care Ethics and Pragmatism: Care As 
Pragmatic Meliorism 
Justin Bell 
UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON–VICTORIA 
There is much to be learned from putting pragmatism and 
care ethics in dialogue. Pragmatism, especially the ethics 
of Dewey and Addams, is already primed to pay attention 
to care as a significant part of moral life. I propose that 
the pragmatist can and should learn a great deal from 
the care ethicist, and appropriate significant parts of 
this philosophy into his or her own ethical deliberations. 
Specifically, I will argue that once we allow the two ethical 
philosophies to cross pollinate, Deweyan ethical theory will 
gain clarification on growth and provide a tool to better 
articulate democracy as a social ethos. 
The major similarity of care ethics and Deweyan pragmatism
is the emphasis both philosophies put on relationships
between people and on establishing a pluralist ethics based
upon imaginative and creative interaction in lived situations.1 
Furthermore, both philosophies emphasize that moral rules
in the style of traditional utilitarianism or deontology are
untenable and thus require some sort of ethical pluralism.
These similarities have been discussed by scholars in both
fields. While I agree that there are some differences between
Dewey’s democratic ethics and care ethics, there are several
points where cross-pollination is possible. Another important
overlap between care ethics and Dewey’s ethical thought
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has to do with the role of empathetic projection in moral
deliberation. Dewey’s emphasis on sympathy (or empathy) 
is an important part of moral inquiry. On this the care ethicist
agrees, and goes so far as to found much of the ethics of
care on this emotional connection with others. 
There are, of course, significant differences between the 
ethics of care and Dewey’s ethics. I share a concern with 
many that care ethics does not give us a fully worked 
out social ethic that can inform our ethical activity in the 
public sphere. Another worry concerns the toll of care on 
the individual. Erin McKenna, for example, worries about 
the requirements of self-sacrifice and the potential for loss 
of identity toward which care ethics tends.2 The potential 
for the annihilation of the individual in engrossment is of 
concern. Pragmatism, with its emphasis on reconstruction
of the individual around actual lived situations, does a 
better job of embracing the growth that occurs through care 
and preserves the individual.3 Pragmatists such as Charlene 
Haddock Seigfried have criticized care ethics for not fully 
acknowledging other important values.4 Furthermore, 
Seigfried argues that on her pragmatist reading care is a 
necessary but not sufficient factor of moral life.5 Virginia 
Held, responding to these criticisms, emphasizes that care 
does not eclipse or supersede other values like justice 
and rights, and, as a matter of fact, rights and access are 
important to establish for women so that they can achieve 
a social position in which care can be acknowledged and 
celebrated. Justice, or any other traditional value that we 
might see in deontological or utilitarian accounts of the 
moral life, simply cannot be the only values—care must be 
considered. When care is not considered, we see problems 
like the reduction of all valuations to those of the market, 
for example.6 On the other hand, Nel Noddings (charitably) 
criticizes Dewey for not fully embracing care, and suggests 
that care ethics has tools that would complete Dewey’s 
project.7 On this I agree. 
The cross-pollination I propose reads care into Dewey’s 
conception of growth. Growth as a moral end, which 
Dewey often calls for, requires clarification due to the 
vagueness of the concept. Critics are right to ask “growth 
toward what end?” Yet, if we read Dewey through a lens 
that takes care seriously we might find some guidance. It is 
my argument that care is an example of growth insofar as 
the care-giver experiences engrossment and the cared-for 
is integrated into an environment. This process gains some 
complexity when all the relationships any one individual 
has are taken into account.8 This complexity does not 
excuse the fundamental nature of giving and receiving care 
as integrative experiences which are growth-oriented. 
Noddings argues that the emotional feeling of care leads 
to engrossment in the other. It leads the one-caring to 
become embedded in the relationship and be “in an 
attitude that warms and comforts the cared-for.”9 The 
cared-for becomes engrossed in the other—a feeling of 
integration and empathy. This is not a “degradation of 
consciousness” or a reprieve from intellectual work.10 
Indeed, acting from care calls for reason and intelligence 
and “what goes on in caring is [or ought to be] rational 
and carefully thought out,” even when the relationship is 
not.11 Furthermore, Noddings suggests that those we care 
for should be cared for in such a way that they themselves 
can care in the future. Gregory Pappas agrees, holding 
that “care that is rightly fused with other traits of character 
does not fall into the kind of harmful care that stultifies the 
growth of those being cared for.”12 This is very similar to 
Dewey’s moral ideal of growth. These similarities show that 
engrossment is itself a form of growth. 
While care is an emotional response, this does not warrant 
us dismissing it as unimportant to the lived situation. 
Pappas reminds us that “emotional appreciation is about 
something that in a situation is experienced as having 
certain qualities.”13 Dewey also emphasizes that emotions 
are not contrary to intelligent moral activity and in fact 
embed us in a situation (Dewey, Ethics, LW 7:270).14 Like 
care ethics, pragmatism holds that empathy is an essential 
part of moral inquiry.15 In his Ethics Dewey could very well 
have been responding to care ethics when he writes: 
There are, however, definite limitations to 
the spontaneous and customary exercise of 
sympathetic admiration and resentment. It rarely 
extends beyond those near to us, members of 
our own family and our friends. . . . And . . . when 
certain acts have become thoroughly habitual, 
they are taken for granted like phenomenon of 
nature and are not judged at all. (LW 7:239) 
Simply put, if we empathize immediately with those who we 
are immediately close to without expanding that empathy, 
we risk immoral activity. 
Dewey, despite warning against the inadequacy of 
sympathy as a sufficient condition of ethical activity, holds 
that sympathy is a fundamental part of ethical inquiry 
that allows us “to put ourselves in the place of another,” 
which allows “the surest way to appreciate what justice 
demands in concrete cases” (LW 7:251). Sympathy’s role is 
that of a guide, when it is properly used, to moral inquiry. 
Dewey holds that sympathy “is the tool, par excellence, for 
resolving complex situations” (LW 7:270). It is not yet clear 
what distinguishes good sympathy, which is the best tool 
for resolution of moral problems, from the bad sympathy 
that restricts people from justly performing activities. 
There are many working in pragmatism that hold empathy 
as important to moral inquiry. Mark Johnson holds 
that empathy when it acts in moral imagination is “an 
imaginative rationality through which we can participate 
empathetically in another’s experience.”16 It is important to 
note that Johnson sees empathy as a part of an imaginative 
rationality that reflects the actual way we inquire and does 
not hold on to empathy as “an artifact of an erroneous 
traditional separation of reasons, imagination, and 
feeling.”17 Similarly, Steven Fesmire holds that empathetic 
imagination is a necessary part of moral inquiry. He holds 
that empathetic projection is a part of inquiry that takes “the 
attitudes of others” and “stirs us beyond our numbness so 
we pause to sort through others’ aspirations, interest, and 
worries as our own.”18 
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Allow me to rearticulate. Empathetic projection is a deeply 
emotional connection to the situation that allows for human 
inquirers to suffer with the world they find themselves in. 
When empathy is working well, we take on the other through 
empathy so that we naturally and impulsively tend to relate 
to others as tied to ourselves. This insight is important as it 
dissolves a traditional dichotomy between self and others in 
such a way as to avoid problems of inherent selfishness, or 
to raise the question of how selfishness relates to altruism. 
Instead, we have a case where interests and the project 
of growth of ordered richness, when properly informed, 
takes on the needs of others as self-interest. My growth 
becomes tied to the growth of others and the interests of 
others become mine. 
Noddings does not disagree. She argues that empathy 
leads her to “receive the other into [herself], and [to] see 
and feel with the other.” Empathy makes one “committed 
to the receptivity that permits [one] to see and feel.”19 
This seeing and feeling, while only temporary, gives 
insight and motivation to whoever is caring. Once this 
empathetic “invasion” occurs one is changed and is 
“prepared to care.”20 This empathy, which the pragmatists 
emphasize to be necessary for moral inquiry, allows for 
the consummatory experience of engrossment. Noddings 
argues that all acts of care, to some extent, involve 
engrossment.21 She argues that there is a fundamental— 
one might say foundational—requirement to care in those 
situations where one is obligated to do so. The pragmatist 
will disagree insofar as this is a problematic value and not 
necessarily a consummatory valuation. 
Engrossment is a form of consummatory experience. 
Particularly the value placed in feeling engrossment is one 
that James Gouinlock would call a consummatory value. 
It is particularly important to recall that Dewey’s ethical 
theory distinguishes between that which is valued and that 
which is valuable. Pappas points out that “Valuing is the 
direct, spontaneous, and pre-cognitive operation where 
we appreciate something by its immediate quality before 
it is subject to reflection,” while “the reflective process 
of arriving at this kind of judgment of value is called 
valuation.”22 On that other hand, what is valuable is found 
when what is valued becomes problematic. This problematic 
value is inquired into and, if it conforms with intelligent 
ends-in-view for activity, we have a value that is valuable.
When inquiry shows that something is valuable we have 
good reason to pursue it. The engrossment that care gives 
can be valuable when that care allows for development of 
ends-in-view that are beneficial and compatible with other 
consummatory values. 
Immediate goods can be developed by inquiry into 
consummatory valuations. Gouinlock reminds us that 
value “is an eventual function in nature, produced with the 
contrivance of intelligence and activity.” Furthermore, “that 
function of experience and nature which Dewey designates 
by the term ‘value’ is the consummatory phase of a situation 
which is initially problematic.”23 Valuations as the result of a 
consummatory experience simply point to the valuable as 
the intellectualized result of activity due to a problematic 
situation. Engrossment becomes valuable insofar as it 
allows for greater possibilities of intelligent activity and is 
negative insofar as it brings about negative possibilities 
or limits the end-in-view of individuals. Noddings will not 
take this step and allow care to be criticized as potentially 
negative. But, when caring decreases the potency of future 
activity, then it no longer is righteous and any engrossment 
felt in that act of “care” is engrossment at the cost of 
possibility for the cared-for. 
Here pragmatism can contribute something back to care 
ethics. Pragmatism’s work on reconstructing individualism
around what we know about the relational nature of human 
beings and the value of individuals for the sake of creativity, 
inquiry, and the respect for dignity gives care ethics a 
significant strengthening. Once an individual develops, 
they are owed autonomy as a matter of care. Individuals, 
once developed (such as we find not only in adults but in 
various levels in all human beings after infancy), require 
some autonomy in order to care for others and themselves.24 
Intelligent and moral growth begets more growth for the 
pragmatist. 
So, what is the end of this cross-pollination? It is my proposal 
that instead of thinking of democracy as a top-down affair, 
as in most theories of justice, we take a page from care 
ethics and look at how democratic interactions are those 
that are not top-down but rather those that come from 
an ethos wherein continual and purposeful interactions 
with those close are transformative and exemplary of 
democratic interactions, as Dewey suggests. Maurice 
Hamington invokes Jane Addams to argue that we embody 
care when we actually have relationships with others and 
develop with them—especially with those who are different 
than we are. This calls for the development of social habits 
that reconstruct individuals into more creative and more 
empathetic persons.25 The overlap of care and pragmatism 
goes further, and the contributions of pragmatism can help 
guard against unfair criticisms of care. When Addams calls 
for “sentimentalism” we are assured that it is not merely 
sentiment in a bare or base sense, but rather a “politics 
of connection that gives care ethics a viable sociopolitical 
dimension.”26 Thus, “democracy becomes a framework for 
individual participation that allows for both individual and 
communal growth.”27 Care can foster and aid intelligent 
growth. Hamington emphasizes that “pragmatism thus 
provides an ideal framework for synthesizing embodied 
care and the caring imagination into a social philosophy of 
care.”28 Again, we see the tools of pragmatism allowing us 
to navigate care in such a way that it is growth in a moral 
and valuable sense. 
Dewey, with Tufts, gives us some clues about how to deal 
with care and Justice in his 1932 Ethics. In criticizing Spencer 
specifically, but in a way applicable to other definitions of 
justice, Dewey argues against a “definite meaning” for 
justice and thinks rather that “the meaning of justice in 
concrete cases is something to be determined by seeing 
what consequences will bring about human welfare in a fair 
and even way” (LW 7:250). Importantly, we determine justice 
in concrete cases and not from any a priori source. Justice 
becomes justice in concrete cases that do not necessarily 
conform to rules set down with absolute precision before 
the lived, experienced situation. A few pages later Dewey 
uses the term “beneficence” to designate those parts of 
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moral obligation that are felt and not dictated by a rational 
or formal process of argumentation. He writes: 
The opposition which is frequently instituted 
between beneficence and justice rests upon 
a narrow conception of the latter as well as 
upon a sentimental conception of the former. If 
beneficence is taken to signify act which exceed 
the necessities of legal obligation, and justice to 
denote the strict letter of moral law there is, if 
course, a wide gap between them. But in reality 
the score of justice is broad enough to cover all 
the conditions which make for social welfare, 
while a large part of what passes as charity and 
philanthropy is merely a makeshift to compensate 
for lack of just social conditions. (LW 7:252) 
I hold that this redefinition of justice implied a reconciliation 
of a rights-based system of justice with a justice that takes 
care seriously. 
There is some vagueness here. I believe that taking 
Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation from Human Nature 
and Conduct is helpful. Here Dewey writes: 
Deliberation is irrational in the degree in which 
an end is so fixed, a passion or interest is so 
absorbing, that the foresight of consequences is 
warped to include only what furthers execution of 
its premeditated bias. Deliberation is rational in 
the degree in which forethought flexibly remakes 
old aims and habits, institutes perception and love 
of new ends and acts. (MW 14:138) 
Dewey’s typically bloodless language wakes up a little 
here. New ends, which come through experience, are 
“loved.” This emotional quality should not be overlooked. I 
do not think that his use of “love” here is an accident. Our 
motivations and drives are deeply emotional. Dewey never 
excludes feelings or emotion from the life of intelligent 
recreation of habits. 
One realistic tool we can gain from the ethics of care 
when we go about asking questions about institutions is 
whether or not the establishment of a procedure or other 
structure precludes or supports individual act of care. I 
think this clarifies pragmatism’s dedication to growth. 
This practical check on institutions, of course, does 
not dictate any particular structure but instead leaves 
inquiry open to investigation in concrete cases. That an 
institution is imperfect is accepted as a real problem which 
demands inquiry into actual human lives—and not going 
back to a merely theoretical drawing board. It is likely in 
the negative that we gain the most clarity by thinking in 
this way. Institutions are unjust by design insofar as they 
preclude the possibility of care. Because moral imagination 
develops over time to deal with the changing problems of 
life, institutions and social structures demand change to 
maintain the possibility of care. How radical the change in 
structures is would require, I think, individual investigations 
into many issues of care. This is impossible to do here, but 
the outcome is radical and would fulfill Dewey’s demand 
to remake the concept of individuality. What is possible to 
do here is to emphasize how incorporating care into our 
moral deliberations in a robust manner serves the end 
of meliorism—because it is through care that we identify 
and potentially check social and political institutions 
for their ability to work toward concrete human values. 
Dewey, memorably, implores philosophers to think of 
the problems of men. This is as much a warning, in this 
regard, to those who want a foundational theory of justice 
which does not take into account the real needs of those 
who suffer. Neoliberalism’s “shocks” and institutionalized 
inequalities—both of which conform to a rule a priori to 
experienced suffering, are two examples that come to 
mind. 
Understanding care and pragmatism in each other’s light 
provides not only a deeply emotional but deeply motivating 
basis to see how democracy should be local before it 
is global, personal before it is public.29 I believe the 
structure that care ethicists suggest is important. That is, 
the meaning of many growth situations is engrossment— 
and engrossment makes up a great deal of situations of 
growth. However, it is not the eclipse of the self, but rather 
an expansion of individual power due to integration. It is a 
reconstruction of individuality around the possibilities and 
meanings inherent in social life. Thus, Deweyan democratic 
openness occurs when individuals are willing to interact, to 
grow. This comes about due to group inquiry, participation 
in activity, and influence on others. Care ethics forces us 
to look at interaction at this basic level—not at the macro-
level. I believe that a tendency to look at structures from 
the macro-level has inclined us to assume that democracy’s 
final justification is in the whole group and not in the 
interactions of individuals. Care ethics would agree with 
pragmatism that democracy is an ethos—albeit articulated 
in a different vocabulary.30 An ethics of care as intelligent 
and valuable is vital to pragmatism’s democratic ideal. 
NOTES 
1.	 M. Regina Leffers, from the point of view of care ethics, points 
out that the complex philosophy of relationships that pragmatists 
like Dewey and Addams argue for are conducive not only to 
seeing how care can work in limited interpersonal manners but 
also how care can be extended beyond immediate relationships. 
Leffers, “Pragmatists Jane Addams and John Dewey Inform the 
Ethics of Care,” Hypatia 8, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 73-74. 
2.	 Erin McKenna, The Need for a Pragmatist Feminist Self,” in 
Feminist Interpretations of John Dewey, ed. Charlene Haddock 
Seigfried (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
2002), 141. 
3.	 James M. Albrecht, Reconstructing Individualism: A Pragmatic 
Tradition from Emerson to Ellison (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2012), 191ff. 
4.	 Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Pragmatism and Feminism: 
Reweaving the Social Fabric (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996), 223. 
5.	 Ibid., 222. 
6.	 Virginia Held, The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 116–18. 
7.	 Nel Noddings, “Dewey’s Philosophy of Education: A Critique from 
the Perspective of Care Ethics,” in The Cambridge Companion 
to Dewey, ed. Molly Cochran (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 265–85. 
8.	 Held is careful to acknowledge where and how a relationship 
might be detrimental to a person’s well-being and therefore 
require a break. However, this break does not change the fact that 
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the relationship occurred and that there are real consequences 
of personhood because of that relationship. Held, The Ethics of 
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14. All citations to the work of John Dewey are to the standard print 
edition, The Collected Works of John Dewey, 1882–1952, ed. Jo 
Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1969–1991), and published as The Early Works (EW), The Middle 
Works (MW), and The Later Works (LW). In citations, the title of 
the work will be followed by the series designation, volume, and 
page number (where appropriate). Thus, “Art as Experience, LW 
10:135” refers to volume 10 of The Later Works, page 135. 
15.	 Although Dewey tended to use the term “sympathy,” as was the 
practice at the time, I believe our contemporary term “empathy” 
is, for this purpose, interchangeable. Pappas makes the same 
claim in John Dewey’s Ethics, 198. 
16. Mark 	 Johnson, Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive 
Science for Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 
200. 
17.	 Ibid., 201. 
18. Steven Fesmire, John Dewey and Moral Imagination: Pragmatism 
in Ethics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 65. 
19.	 Noddings, Caring, 31. 
20. Ibid., 30. 
21. Ibid., 17. 
22. Pappas, Dewey’s Ethics, 104-105. 
23.	 James Gouinlock, John Dewey’s Philosophy of Value (New York: 
Humanities Press, 1972), 125. 
24. Michael 	 Slote, The Ethics of Care and Empathy (London: 
Routledge, 2007), 42–53. 
25.	 Maurice Hamington, Embodied Care: Jane Addams, Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, and Feminist Ethics (Urbana; University of Illinois 
Press, 2004), 108-109. 
26. Ibid., 95. 
27.	 Ibid., 91. 
28. Ibid. 
29.	 See Albrecht, Reconstructing Individualism, 266ff, for a 
discussion of Dewey’s democratic philosophy, which is local 
before extending out to larger intuitions. 
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Care Ethics and Pragmatism: Cultivating 
Empathy with Nonhuman Others through 
Moral Imagination 
Tess Varner 
UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA 
The political action of citizens of an organized community 
will not be morally satisfactory unless they have, individually, 
sympathetic dispositions. 
– John Dewey1 
In recent years, many scholars have rightly identified fertile 
intersections between feminist care ethics and pragmatism, 
particularly in the work of John Dewey. Dewey importantly 
highlights radical connectedness among individuals and 
the creative space that such connectedness can open 
for growth. This connectedness is of great significance 
to care ethics, too, which centers on relationships and 
contexts, rather than on fixed rules and principles about 
moral adjudication. Unlike many philosophical traditions, 
a Deweyan ethical framework refuses to subordinate 
emotions and the affective to an absolutist idea of so-called 
rationality within moral deliberative processes, so his work 
should be particularly relevant to care ethicists. 
Care ethics, particularly its early iterations, has been 
harshly criticized for what many see as unavoidable pitfalls. 
Twin emphases on women’s natural or innate caring skills 
and on mothering have led to claims of essentialism, 
and the highly contextual nature of care ethics draws 
accusations of relativism. I contend, with others like 
Maurice Hamington, Véronique Mottier, and Deane Curtin, 
that a Deweyan theoretical model can help avoid some of 
the challenges that care ethics faces, and that a vision of 
community informed by Dewey’s democratic ideal can help 
us to widen the circle of those for whom we care. Further, I 
claim that this care can be appropriately widened in order 
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to include nonhuman others. In this paper, I place Dewey’s 
idea of the moral imagination (particularly its emphasis 
on empathy, which I contend deserves more attention) 
in conversation with care ethicists in order to explore 
how we can widen the circle of our care well beyond our 
intimates to include all members of the moral community, 
including nonhuman stakeholders, from domestic and 
wild animals to trees, plants, water sources, and more. In 
order to make a significant impact on our relations with 
nonhuman others, we need a politicized ethic of caring that 
understands nonhuman others to be stakeholders within 
our communities. 
PART ONE: THE EXPANDED MORAL COMMUNITY 
Many of the early iterations of care ethics focused on attempts 
to “name the unnamed”—to identify the moral motivations 
for action in our caring relationships that had often been 
ignored or devalued. Care ethicists raised concerns about 
phallocentric biases in traditional ethical theories that fail 
to account for complexities in relationships, fail to address 
responsibilities and desires to meet the needs of others, 
and fail to admit our ontological connections to one 
another. Often framed as oppositional to traditional ethics, 
care ethics has, according to Hamington, been “sharply 
contrasted with existing accounts of morality, [those] often 
categorized as ‘justice.’”2 But this dichotomous framing has 
drawn serious criticism, and care theorists have attempted 
to resolve those tensions by insisting that care, rather than 
being antithetical to justice, is a prerequisite for justice.3 
Kathryn Tanner, for example, insists that care and justice 
rely on one another: “Isolated from one another, an ethic of 
either care or justice has its moral dangers. Care becomes, 
for example, parochial and paternalistic, justice becomes 
inhumane, rigid, and impossible to implement. Moral 
vision is advanced, feminist ethicists are beginning to 
argue, only when both perspectives are emended, one by 
the other.”4 Similarly, Virginia Held claims that “there can 
be care without justice . . . [but] there can be no justice 
without care.”5 This reframing has provided the basis for 
care theorists’ claim that justice at its best will always be 
“underwritten by care for others.”6 This is the picture of 
justice that those concerned for nonhuman others may 
wisely appropriate. If care should underwrite our just 
relations with others in a moral community, one task for the 
ethicist is to see if we can extend the notion of the moral 
community to include nonhuman others as well as human 
others. 
In keeping with many feminists and pragmatists and with 
Dewey in particular, I argue that we are radically social 
creatures—inextricably tied to one another. Dewey rejects 
the idea of a free, autonomous individual and presents, 
rather, a picture of a dynamic, ontologically social self. 
Because of our social situatedness, our moral evaluations 
cannot be impartial or abstract but must be grounded in 
lived experiences, including our own experiences and the 
experiences of others, all of which take place in a given 
environment. To care for others is part of caring for oneself. 
Dewey argues that “interest in the social whole of which 
one is a member necessarily carries with it interest in one’s 
own self….To suppose that social interest is incompatible 
with concern for one’s own health, learning, advancement, 
power of judgment, etc., is, literally, nonsensical.”7 
Our biotic communities are a significant part of that 
social whole. So we must not only acknowledge our 
social situatedness, but must also must acknowledge 
that we are ecologically situated. Our biotic communities 
are inextricably tied to our lived experience. Thus, in our 
democratic communities, we have a responsibility to 
attend to the interests of nonhuman others—to represent 
those interests—ineffable as they may be—in our ongoing 
conversation of democracy. A Deweyan concept of the 
moral imagination may be a way to approach representing 
those interests. Through dramatic rehearsals, informed 
by empathetic, imaginative caring, we can improve our 
understanding of the interests of nonhuman others and, 
in so doing, can develop genuine caring relationships that 
can ground our approaches to environmental justice. 
PART TWO: MODELS OF CARE AND THE
PROBLEMS WITH EXTENDING CARE 
Many environmental pragmatists have begun to borrow 
directly from the language of care in order to extend 
beyond caring relationships with humans to caring 
relationships with nonhuman others. I suggest that there is 
a rich possibility in such an extension, but that a nuanced 
version of care must be established. Many of the models 
of care that emerge in the literature are insufficient to 
justify an extension of care to nonhuman others. I advocate 
here for a citizenship-model of caring, but I’ll first consider 
some other possible models and what I see to be their 
shortcomings. 
A good deal of the literature on care ethics suggests 
that our model of care ought to grow out of our natural 
relationships. Much of the emphasis is on parent-child 
relationships—particularly, at least in the early literature, on 
mothering. Our own intimate affiliations shape our view of 
the world and our view of ourselves. Carol Gilligan writes: 
The experiences of inequality and interconnection, 
inherent in the relation of parent and child, then 
give rise to the ethics of justice and care, the 
ideals of human relationship—the vision that self 
and other will be treated as of equal worth, that 
despite differences in power, things will be fair; 
the vision that everyone will be responded to and 
included, that no one will be left alone or hurt. 
These disparate visions in their tension reflect the 
paradoxical truths of human experience—that we 
know ourselves as separate only insofar as we live 
in connection with others, and that we experience 
relationship only insofar as we differentiate other 
from self. (63) 
Because, for most of us, our first relationship is with our 
mother, care ethicists have often contended that it is the 
image of ethical caring on which we should base our other 
relationships. Mothering care should then be applied to 
other relationships. 
Yet the mothering model invites challenges. It is highly 
vulnerable to claims of essentialism. Even its more gender-
neutral formulation, a parent-child model, raises concerns. 
There are numerous kinds of parenting that are unhealthy 
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or unsafe or at least fail to provide proper care. But the 
more troubling challenge, I argue, is that it is not clear why 
or how this model can be extended beyond one’s intimates. 
Parenting, though certainly guided by social conventions, 
is discretional. One can choose how much to care for one’s 
child or whether to care at all. Mothering and parenting 
may serve well as a model for healthy caring within 
families or small groups, or, perhaps even for relationships 
with companion animals. But it is difficult to see how 
this model of caring will not lead to, or at least allow, an 
isolated kind of caring—one which is limited to one’s 
intimates—that certainly wouldn’t extend well to others 
with whom we have no close ties or affinities, human or 
nonhuman. While a mothering or parenting model may be 
very useful for intimate, interpersonal caring interactions, it 
is an insufficient model to provide the extension to those 
with whom we have no close ties—particularly nonhuman 
others. 
Other models of care have similar pitfalls. In Caring: 
Gender-Sensitive Ethics, Peta Bowden looks at the kind 
of care found in friendships. Friendship is a relatively 
unstructured and informal kind of caring compared to 
mothering, which is thoroughly enmeshed in social 
institutions of the family. It is another kind of natural caring, 
based on one’s own affinities and affections. But because 
expectations of friendship are not clearly defined through 
an institution, they are flexible. However, because there are 
so few expectations and principles guiding experiences of 
friendship, they are also vulnerable. Bowden writes, “The 
expansive promise of friendship, the possibility of freely 
choosing and being freely chosen, is conditioned by 
vulnerability to the vicissitudes of its participants and the 
exigencies of the more structured relations in which they 
are involved.”8 Though friendship is an important indicator 
of our inclination to care, the model of caring in friendship 
lacks the structure that would make caring for nonhuman 
others secure. 
Useful here is the distinction between natural and ethical 
caring. Natural caring, like a healthy relationship between 
mother and child or close friends, often takes little effort. It 
does involve a choice, as no one is forced to care, but the 
choice is often an easy one. Ethical caring, on the contrary, 
takes cultivation. It is, to appropriate Dewey’s language, a 
habit. Hamington notes that ethical caring “covers those 
instances when we must make a reflective choice whether 
to care.”9 Natural caring is expected among our family and 
friends, to one degree or another, but ethical caring is 
the kind of caring at work when we encounter others with 
whom it is difficult to identify. Ethical caring, then, is the 
sort of care needed to extend our caring relationships to 
nonhuman others. 
The model of care which I think is more suitable for our 
relationship with nonhuman others is a kind of caring that is 
both intelligent and intentional—it involves both a natural 
skill and a practice to be cultivated. A citizenship model of 
care is the kind of caring that may have the richest potential 
to guide our extension of care to nonhuman others. Unlike 
familial caring and friendship, the bonds of citizens within 
a community are not typically characterized by intimacy or 
personal engagement. As Bowden puts it, “Citizen relations 
are more likely to denote interpersonal connections that 
eschew the values of intimacy and personally engaged 
care.”10 For Bowden, the term citizens, in this instance, 
simply denotes those individuals whose relationships 
are characterized by their “association within the public 
sphere.”11 Citizenship is denoted by our consenting to 
association with one another in virtue of our very presence 
together in community. Citizen relations are much more 
generalized forms of interpersonal interaction than other 
relationships, but it is in view of this generality that I think 
citizen-caring can encompass the interests of others with 
whom we have no intimate bonds, including a variety of 
nonhuman others. The strength of the care among citizens, 
according to Bowden, is that “predictability, stability, and 
control of the outcomes and activities are predominant 
goals.”12 Unlike other kinds of caring, citizen-caring is 
planned, thoughtful, and critical. Strong democratic 
communities participate in dialogue and debate, engaging 
diverse voices and considering possible outcomes of 
actions. In most cases, citizens do not respond with direct, 
immediate action to perceived needs, but intelligently 
attend to the various possibilities and solutions. Because 
citizen-caring is not care characterized by strong affections 
and intimacy, it provides a degree of security that does 
not depend on love for the other, but on commitment to 
the whole. It resists the charge of prejudices that natural 
caring falls prey to. As Lori Gruen writes, “From an ethical 
point of view, the interests of all who have them should 
be taken into account. To favor someone’s interests over 
another’s, simply because you like, want to impress, or can 
relate to the first person, and dislike, don’t care about, or 
can’t relate to the second person, would be objectionably 
prejudicial.”13 Furthermore, citizens do not depend on direct 
reciprocity to one another. Instead, citizens contribute in 
various ways and in various degrees, and expect, also in 
various degrees, for their needs to be met similarly—by the 
community, rather than through one particular relationship. 
Because natural kinds of caring are generally freely 
chosen and because they can fairly easily be opted out of, 
they cannot secure the care that is necessary for justice 
for nonhuman others. Furthermore—and perhaps more 
importantly—natural caring includes direct responses 
to immediate needs felt by those with whom we 
identify, responses often lacking critical reflection about 
consequences and taking on the form of “unenlightened 
benevolence,” to borrow Dewey’s words.14 
The kind of care I see emerging from a reading of Dewey 
is a structured, politicized caring—a kind of caring that 
can be implemented into communities and institutions 
and that would provide the stability necessary to ground 
a caring response to nonhuman others. While admitting 
that our natural affinities are important to ethical caring, 
ethical caring does not rely solely on actual fondness for 
a particular person or animal or species. I do not need 
to actually like the snake that creeps around the side of 
my house, but I can care for snakes and their well-being 
without feeling a particular affection for them. The kind 
of caring I see emerging from Dewey is not direct caring, 
like the ties of affinity we feel for our family members or
friends, but is instead an intellectual, thoughtful caring that 
allows us to look outside ourselves and into others and to 
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better imagine possible solutions to conflicts with others. 
Because I care for myself and for others, and because I care 
for the environment that that such care takes place in, I can 
recognize the responsibility to care for the subjects that 
comprise that environment. Critical, intelligent empathy 
allows me to assess my own needs and the needs of others 
with whom I am in community, human and nonhuman. 
It allows me to highlight differences and recognize 
similarities, challenging conventions of understanding 
and thus opening up space for creative dialogue and, 
ultimately, growth and change. It is the critical nature of 
this empathy that sparks the moral imagination. Dewey 
asserts, “Regard for self and regard for others should not 
. . . be direct motives to overt action. They should be forces 
which lead us to think of objects and consequences that 
would otherwise escape notice.”15 That force is what moves 
Dewey’s idea of the moral imagination. 
PART THREE: BIOCITIZENSHIP AND THE MORAL
IMAGINATION 
Dewey posits the concept of the moral imagination as a way 
to approach the interests of others in moral deliberations. 
While he speaks of the interests of others in terms of 
humans, I suggest that this notion need not necessarily be 
limited to the human members of a moral community. It 
can be extended to apply to the many ways we can attend 
to the interests of a wider spectrum of citizens of the moral 
community, including the interests of nonhuman others. 
There are two elements of the moral imagination that 
emerge in Dewey’s work. The first element is “empathetic 
projection.” Before creative solutions to moral problems 
can be developed, we must be able to (or perhaps, must 
at least attempt to) understand the interests of others. 
This is an active, experimental, and playful element. The 
second element is “dramatic rehearsal,” which includes 
creatively tapping the possibilities within a conflict. A great 
deal of the current scholarship on Dewey’s notion of the 
moral imagination seems to focus on dramatic rehearsal, 
yet I think that in order to expand Dewey’s model to 
nonhuman nature in a morally responsible way, we must 
give more attention to the role of empathy. Hamington 
claims that moral imagination is crucial to care ethics. The 
contrapositive I suggest here is that care—particularly a 
politicized, imaginative, ethical, empathetic caring—is 
crucial to moral imagination in terms of environmental 
justice. 
According to Hamington, “the more understanding we 
have or gain of the stranger, the more potential there is to 
imagine empathizing and caring.”16 Authentic care requires 
knowledge of the subject being empathized with—even 
a limited and imperfect knowledge—for it to be likely to 
effect change in ethically significant ways. Hamington 
goes on to explain that “we care about that which we 
know, and it is difficult to care for that which we have little 
or no knowledge of. Although knowing is not a sufficient 
condition of caring, it is a prerequisite.”17 Thus, as we 
approach nonhuman subjects with empathy, that empathy 
ought to be active and engaged, attending to the interests 
of the subject rather than assuming interests based on 
our own experiences or projecting our anthropocentric 
interests. Care ethics enriches the idea of the moral 
imagination here, helping us see how empathy can play an 
important role in transactions with nonhuman nature and 
how it must play an important role in dramatic rehearsal.
 I contend that, rather than existing as two independent 
pieces of the moral imagination—empathetic projection 
and dramatic rehearsal—the two are interwoven. Empathy 
is an essential component to robust dramatic rehearsal. It 
is only once one develops empathy for the plight of others 
and an understanding of those others’ interests that one 
can creatively begin tapping possibilities embedded in 
problems of justice for nonhuman nature in a way that is true 
to the interests of the nonhuman others. The dissonance 
of diverse, yet interconnected, voices in community opens 
space for growth. 
Of course, empathetic caring responses are certainly 
imperfect. Extended too far, empathy can be dangerous. 
Empathy relies on sophistication in the thought-processes 
of the empathizer. The empathizer must interpret feelings, 
needs, or interests of the subject of empathy, leaving 
limitless room for misinterpretation of the interests of the 
subject of empathy and requiring that the empathizer have 
a deep awareness of possible personal limitations in the 
ability to interpret. Empathetic responses can fall prey to 
imperialist, racist, and sexist pitfalls common with other 
responses. Empathy is thus inevitably fallible. Empathy, 
as we have the capacity for it, will never be empathy 
perfected. Yet, I contend that even flawed empathy is 
an essential component to a just approach to nonhuman 
others. Although we can never adequately know how it 
feels to be a suffering animal or an ecosystem in need of 
water, our responses to these problems are more likely to 
be just if approached with empathy, not pity or dominion 
or other kinds of responses. If we are able to imaginatively 
take the place of an other, we are more likely to respond 
to their own interests, as best as we can perceive them. 
Furthermore, this is why a pragmatist-feminist model of 
caring must be a politicized model of caring. As Catherine 
MacKinnon explains, we will always be for caring and 
empathy “without letting power off the hook.”18 Josephine 
Donovan and Carol Adams explain further: “The care theory 
we advocate goes beyond compassion to include caring 
enough to find out who is causing harm and stopping it” 
(14). 
Possibilities for resolution within a conflict are often left 
undiscovered if one only approaches the conflict with fixed 
rules and principles. Dewey’s challenge to the traditional 
idea that rules and principles are what tether us to moral 
decision-making is the basis for the emergence of the 
moral imagination. As Steven Fesmire explains, for Dewey, 
“principles and rules supplement but do not constitute 
ethics.”19 Thus, instead of relying on rules and principles, 
Dewey turns the focus of moral deliberation to imagination 
in the form of dramatic rehearsal, a creative exercise which 
can unearth possibilities for growth and change. 
Fesmire writes, “If there is a single lesson of the sciences, 
for Dewey it is that beliefs that mature through ongoing 
interactive engagement with the world are truer to the 
mark.”20 Passive speculation about possibilities and 
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heavy reliance on conventions of thought leave avenues 
unexplored and ideas untapped, but imagination, 
which, for Dewey, is active and experimental, “ventures 
beyond restatements of contention to grasp undisclosed 
opportunities to generate new ideals and ends.”21 When 
intimately tied to empathy, dramatic rehearsal looks 
beyond the immediate environment and surroundings. It 
extends the environment to which we can appropriately 
respond. Thus, the interests of others which might 
otherwise go unnoticed are revealed when imagination 
becomes involved. In addition to being active, this kind of 
deliberation, according to Dewey, is “dramatic” because 
it deals with life’s dramas. Dewey looks to conflicts in 
terms of narrative—a life story which the decision-maker 
is part of, not separate from, disengaged, and indifferent. 
When the decision-maker recognizes his or her role in the 
drama, he or she becomes “co-author to a dramatic story 
with environing conditions in community with others.”22 
Imagination at its best, for Dewey, is always consultative. 
It engages as many co-authors to the narrative as it can 
identify, requiring communication in various forms since it 
is ever-changing and experimental. Through colloquy, “we 
place ourselves in the emerging drama of others’ lives to 
discover actions that may meaningfully continue their life-
stories alongside our own.”23 
So many responses to environmental crises fail to take 
into account the importance of knowing the other. Yet, 
as Hamington suggests, knowledge is an essential 
part of caring. He writes: “One needs to know the 
individuals and situation of those involved to richly think 
through the implications of moral decisions. Failure to 
acquire such understanding will result in a truncated 
or superficial dramatic rehearsal that can degenerate 
into simple rule application or an ethical calculus.”24 Our 
best caring practices emerge when our care is based on 
acknowledgement of both our interconnectedness and our 
existential differences, though, of course, this is no small 
task. 
Feminists and care ethicists have drawn attention to the 
myriad problems associated with communication across 
difference. While the discourse about communication 
across difference has primarily been in the context of 
cross-racial dialogue, it is applicable to representing 
or understanding interests of any others with whom 
communication barriers exist, including nonhuman others. 
María Lugones develops an idea of playful world-traveling 
that may further enrich our idea of the moral imagination. 
Lugones’s work addresses the problems associated with 
any attempt to have a productive dialogue between two 
subjects who come from radically different cultures and 
different contexts—“cross-racial loving,”25 as she deems it. 
Noticing a tendency towards perceiving others arrogantly, 
Lugones develops a concept of playful world-traveling 
that includes skillful and creative ways of being flexible 
enough to enter, exit, and return again to one another’s 
worlds. Replacing arrogance and imperialism with loving 
perception and playfulness allows us to consult something 
other than our own will in our inquiries, and, perhaps, to
find new ways to represent the voices of distant others, 
even nonhuman others. Once one develops empathy for 
the plight of others and an understanding of those others’ 
interests, one can begin to creatively tap the possibilities 
embedded in the conflict. This, to my mind, is precisely 
the kind of dramatic rehearsal we can see in a Deweyan 
approach to nonhuman others. 
When we see ourselves as necessarily both socially and 
ecologically situated as citizens in a moral community that 
includes diverse members, we can begin to recognize the 
importance of giving all stakeholders within a community a 
voice in democratic colloquy. Still, we cannot know exactly 
how to speak for a diminishing species or a threatened 
watershed. The exercise will necessarily be experimental 
and playful and creative. But when our attempts are 
informed by caring relationship and an understanding of 
the plurality of values of the stakeholders, we can come 
closer to the kind of justice and care we seek. 
CONCLUSION 
The radical connectedness that is a central tenet of many 
care ethicists and, indeed, of John Dewey, is what makes 
an extension of care to nonhuman others conceivable. This 
radical connectedness, Regina Leffers writes, “provides 
the theoretical foundation that can explain why the caring 
response at the highest level of moral reasoning in these 
ethics of care includes both self and other and also why 
it is capable of moving beyond particularity, including 
others who ostensibly exist outside of our individual 
human circles.”26 Our best moral deliberation, that which 
engages the moral imagination in order to open space for 
growth and change and creative solutions to conflicts, is 
deliberation that takes into account the entirety of our life-
narrative as citizens of a moral community—a community 
which encompasses our close, caring relations with our 
intimates, friends, and acquaintances and intelligent, 
empathetic care for the nonhuman stakeholders within our 
communities. 
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Rationing in the ICU: First-Come,
First-Served? 
Leonard M. Fleck 
COLLEGE OF HUMAN MEDICINE, MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY 
Note: This essay is intended as an introduction to a panel 
session planned for the Philosophy and Medicine session 
at the Eastern Division APA meeting in January of 2016. The 
session will address a broader range of ethics issues related 
to rationing in the ICU than does this essay, but this essay 
should serve as a provocative introduction. 
I. A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 
The modern intensive care unit (ICU) is only a little over fifty 
years old. Its primary purpose has been to save lives that 
require prompt and complex medical or surgical care. To a 
large extent the ICU has been quite successful in achieving 
that objective. Roughly 83 percent of patients who are 
admitted to an ICU will emerge alive from that ICU, which 
means 17 percent of patients will die while receiving care 
in an ICU. ICU beds make up about 8 percent of hospital 
beds in the United States but account for about 20 percent 
of total hospital costs.1 Given the intensity of care provided, 
few will be surprised by this cost discrepancy. However, 
there is intense pressure to control health care costs in the 
United States.2 In 2014 the United States spent $3 trillion 
on health care, roughly 17.5 percent of GDP.3 Roughly $50 
billion was spent by Medicare on patients in the last two 
months of life. The vast majority of that money would have 
been for ICU care. Hospitals typically have occupancy 
rates of 65 percent to 85 percent, but ICUs are typically 
at 100 percent on any given day. This is why hospital ICU 
physicians are faced on a daily basis with the problem of 
health care rationing. The obvious solution to this ethical 
issue would seem to be building more ICU beds. However, 
from the perspective of cost-conscious health policy 
analysts that would be exactly the wrong solution. This 
would only encourage filling those beds with patients who 
were likely to benefit no more than marginally from having 
access to that bed. That is, the cost of health care would 
be driven further skyward with very little objective benefit 
to justify those costs. The practical conclusion would seem 
to be that ICU physicians must continue to struggle with 
health care rationing in the ICU. 
This situation precipitated the need for more explicit 
guidance regarding how to make such rationing decisions 
justly, especially when the public perception was that life 
itself could be at stake for a patient denied admission to the 
ICU. More specifically, the concern was that such decisions 
should not be left to the prejudices and other decisional 
vagaries of physicians controlling admission to the ICU. 
Consequently, a Bioethics Task Force of the American 
Thoracic Society was charged with articulating the needed 
ethical guidelines. The result was a report published in 
1997 under the title “Fair Allocation of Intensive Care Unit 
Resources.”4 The authors started that report by saying that 
the primary goal of ICU was to preserve “meaningful human 
life,” by which they meant “a quality of life personally valued 
and appreciated by the patient.”5 The practical implication 
of this statement is that it would not be unjust to deny ICU 
admission to patients in a persistent vegetative state or to 
patients in the late stages of various dementias. (Some may 
find this position ethically troubling, but for purposes of 
this essay I will pass over that in silence.) 
II. ICU RATIONING GUIDELINES: AMERICAN
THORACIC SOCIETY 
Near the beginning of their essay the Thoracic Society 
authors stated five principles which they jointly affirmed 
as underlying their recommendations regarding ICU 
care rationing. Very briefly, they affirmed that every 
individual is of equal value, that patient autonomy ought 
to be respected, that the goal of ICU care is to enhance 
a patient’s welfare, that medically appropriate ICU care 
should be regarded as an essential component of a 
basic benefit package available to all, and that the duty 
of physicians to benefit their patients “has limits when 
doing so unfairly compromises the availability of resources 
needed by others.”6 So, when exactly is it that providing 
access to the ICU, or technology in the ICU (such as ECMO), 
represents an unfair compromise of resources to which 
others presumably have a stronger just claim? 
The authors respond to this last question with twelve 
propositions that are intended to express ethically 
appropriate reasons for offering or denying a patient 
access to the ICU. I will not try to critically assess all these 
propositions, but I will focus only on proposition number 
six, which endorses a first-come first-served principle. But to 
appreciate the point of that proposition we need to review 
the preceding propositions. The first proposition states that 
only patients with “sufficient medical need” have a prima 
facie just claim to ICU resources. In other words, a patient 
with a high anxiety level about a very ordinary surgery may 
not have her anxiety relieved by a physician responding 
positively to her demand for an ICU bed. The second 
proposition states that ICU care “should provide the patient 
a certain degree of potential benefit.”7 Again, the authors 
add that patients with advanced dementia or in a persistent 
vegetative state would not meet this criterion. Likewise, a 
SPRING 2015 | VOLUME 14  | NUMBER 2 	 PAGE 31 
APA NEWSLETTER  |  PHILOSOPHY AND MEDICINE
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
patient might need hospital care for that routine surgery, 
but the ICU might not be able to provide more than a very 
minor benefit over and above what can be competently 
provided in an ordinary hospital unit. Such a patient would 
not have a just claim to an ICU bed. The same will be true 
(often) for patients who are certain to die of their current 
illness very shortly; there may be very little of substantial 
benefit that the ICU can offer that could not be provided 
by an excellent palliative care service (and it will often 
enough be the case that aggressive, family-demanded ICU 
care yields a net harm for such patients, which would not 
appear to be something that patients would demand for 
themselves as a matter of justice). 
The third proposition is that patients (when possible) 
ought to give informed consent for both the initiation 
and continuation of ICU care, a point that would be most 
ethically salient when such care is likely to represent a net 
harm to the patient. The fourth proposition is that patients 
ought to have equal access to ICU care “regardless of their 
personal and behavioral characteristics.”8 In other words, 
nothing about the patient’s age, or social status, or religious 
or political beliefs, or sexual orientation, or general lack of 
compliance to social norms ought to result in him or her 
having less than equal access to the ICU compared to other 
patients with comparable medical need and likelihood to 
benefit. The fifth proposition adds to the fourth that ability 
to pay should be irrelevant to determining access to the 
ICU, given sufficient medical need and ability to benefit 
from that care. 
The sixth proposition is the one that will receive the bulk of 
our critical attention. The authors write: “When demand for 
ICU beds exceeds supply, medically appropriate patients 
should be admitted on a first-come, first-served basis.”9 The 
authors reject a utilitarian approach to ICU bed rationing, 
i.e., giving preferred admission status to a patient with 
a better prognosis over another equally needy patient 
with a somewhat worse prognosis. We might imagine 
this situation. An 85-year old with a severe heart attack 
and emergency bypass surgery has just been admitted 
to the last bed in the ICU, when two hours later a 50-year 
old accident victim needs that same bed after having 
emergency surgery. Both are expected to be discharged 
alive, but the 85-year old has a cancer that is very likely 
to kill him within two years. The authors would clearly not 
endorse removing the 85-year old from the ICU in order to 
make room for the 50-year old, though “obviously” many 
more high-quality life-years would likely be saved if such 
a switch were made. This conclusion will strike many as 
something ethically problematic. But, to be fair, we should 
examine the reasons and reasoning of the authors in 
support of this conclusion. 
III. FIRST-COME, FIRST-SERVED: THE ETHICAL
JUSTIFICATION 
The Thoracic Society authors start by affirming again that 
every individual’s life is equally valuable. Further, they 
contend that there must be thresholds for both medical need 
and medical benefit that must be met before invoking the 
first-come first-served rule. In other words, as mentioned 
earlier, individuals must have sufficiently urgent and 
complex medical need that requires ICU care that cannot 
be adequately and effectively addressed outside the ICU 
by other hospital services. Further, there must be sufficient 
likelihood of substantial benefit. If there is a 90 percent or 
greater chance that an individual is going to die within a 
week in spite of anything the ICU might offer, then that lack 
of sufficient benefit means the necessary threshold will not 
be crossed that would justify admission on a first-come 
first-served basis. In the example above, both patients 
would satisfy this threshold criterion, though the older 
patient arrived first. Still, what is ethically troubling is that 
so many life-years would be put “at-risk” by not providing 
that younger patient with immediate access to an ICU bed. 
In one article I read the authors looked at a year’s worth of 
delayed admissions to an ICU bed. What they found was 
that each hour of delayed admission represented a 1.5 
percent increased risk of ICU mortality.10 As noted, it seems 
neither rational nor just that so many life-years would be 
put at risk. But that seeming might be ethically misleading. 
We might imagine that this is a fifteen-bed ICU, that if it 
feels unseemly to discharge our 85-year old patient, who 
is expected to recover, that surely there must be another 
patient in that ICU who could be justly discharged in order 
to make room for our 50-year old patient. Our Thoracic 
Society authors would consider such an option. They agree 
that no one has a right to that ICU bed for the indefinite 
future, especially if in the course of their stay they no 
longer meet the threshold requirements that justified their 
admission in the first place. They might fail to meet those 
threshold requirements in one of two ways. They might 
have gotten “better enough” that additional days in the ICU 
would make no more than a marginal difference in benefit 
for them. That is, those patients are most likely to survive 
with a few extra days in a regular hospital bed, though 
there might still be a very small risk of a sudden medical 
reversal that could prove fatal. Still, those patients may 
be justly removed from the ICU. Alternatively, if patients 
now occupying a bed have failed to benefit from ICU care, 
have gotten worse so that their prognosis is more than 90 
percent likely that they will die within the next few days, 
then they too may be justly removed in order to make room 
for our 50-year old patient. However, we need to consider 
yet another scenario in order to test the ethical reliability of 
that first-come first-served rule. 
Imagine that all the other patients currently in the ICU
continue to meet those threshold criteria that justified
their admission in the first place. Physicians might have
their suspicions and intuitions about which patients are
likely to survive that ICU stay and which ones will not.
And, as many ICU physicians know, there are a number
of prognostic tools in general use that can generate a
more objective picture of prognosis for each of these
patients. (For the curious reader these tools will have
acronyms such as APACHE IV, SOFA, and TISS.11) These
tools are informative but not consistently reliable in the
prognostic information that they generate. Consequently,
the Thoracic Society authors conclude that it would be
ethically problematic to make what in some cases would
be life and death decisions on the basis of the prognostic
information generated by these tools. And it would be
even more problematic to rely upon “clinician judgment”
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of prognosis in comparing patients since such judgments
would be too greatly vulnerable to bias, ambiguity, and
subjectivity. Their conclusion is that we must stick with the
first-come first-served rule. They see this as being justified
by a commitment to a fundamentally egalitarian principle.
All these lives are of equal value. This approach has the
moral virtues of a lottery; it is impartial and impersonal.
It might not be ethically perfect because at times “smart
patients” and “rich patients” might be able to get to the
ICU door first, but the utilitarian alternative is seen by the
authors as being more ethically flawed. 
IV. FIRST-COME, FIRST-SERVED: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS 
In the remainder of this essay I want to test the ethical 
robustness of the first-come first-served rule with respect 
to ICU rationing. I will argue that it is largely reliable in 
yielding “just enough” rationing decisions with regard to 
ICU access, but that it is in need of some limitations and 
constraints in specific clinical situations. I want to start my 
analysis by trying to better understand the rule itself. 
We might imagine this situation. A lifeguard is in a boat, 
no other lifeguards around, when he notices two men 
drowning. They are roughly equidistant from his boat but 
in roughly opposite directions. He knows he can only save 
one of them. He arbitrarily picks one of them and rushes to 
get close enough that he can throw the man a lifeline. As 
the man is drawn closer to the boat the lifeguard realizes 
that this is a real estate agent who cheated him out of 
$10,000 several years ago. He jerks the lifeline out of the 
individual’s hands because there is still time to get to the 
other individual and save his life. How should we judge 
from a moral point of view the action of the lifeguard? It 
seems we would judge him harshly. Suppose the lifeguard 
tried to justify his behavior by saying that he knew he had 
an obligation to save someone, because that was his social 
role, but neither drowning individual had any more of a just 
claim to his services than the other, and he was entirely 
free to save one or the other. He did make one choice at 
first, but he changed his mind about who to save, and this 
was his prerogative. I assume that all my readers would 
conclude that this was just the worst sort of rationalization 
of clearly bad behavior. That real estate agent (no doubt 
despicable) turned out to be “first-come” by virtue of the 
choice that the lifeguard made, and, hence, he had the 
moral right to be the first-saved. 
We can modify the scenario a bit. The drowning individuals 
are again roughly equidistant from the lifeguard. The 
lifeguard arbitrarily picks one to save and throws out the 
lifeline but then quickly realizes that this is a “really old” 
guy he is about to save while the other individual must 
be a lot younger with more life-years to lose. Having 
been profoundly influenced by a passionate utilitarian 
philosopher in an undergraduate philosophy course, he 
quickly gets his boat over to save the other individual. 
Would we be justified in judging any less harshly the 
lifeguard in this second scenario compared to our first 
scenario? Again, it seems the first-come first-served rule 
best explains the harsh judgment we would make of the 
lifeguard in either scenario. As nearly as I can judge, these 
scenarios seem very analogous to the circumstances of the 
ICU physician charged with responsibility for determining 
who has the strongest just claim to the last bed in the ICU 
in the scenario I sketched above. 
We can imagine a third version of our scenario, starting 
with our second scenario. The lifeguard tosses the lifeline 
to the older drowning individual who has grabbed hold. But 
the lifeguard doubts that he has made the right choice. A 
wave disrupts the grip of the old man on the lifeline, which 
allows the lifeguard to think, “Now I can make a different 
choice; it would have been wrong for me to jerk the lifeline 
from his hands but he is the one who let go.” And he hurries 
over to the other drowning individual. My judgment is that 
the lifeguard would be open to justified moral criticism for 
essentially the same reason as in our first two scenarios. If 
our 85-year old patient experienced some life-threatening 
emergency event within an hour of being admitted to the 
ICU, an event the ICU was well-prepared to reverse, we 
would judge as unjust an ICU physician who ordered the 
ICU staff to allow the patient to die so that a bed would then 
be available for the 50-year old emergency room patient. 
Again, this seems to strengthen the prima facie rightness 
of the first-come first-served rule endorsed by the Thoracic 
Society group. Having said that, I now want to consider an 
alternate scenario that might require that some limitations 
be attached to our first-come first-served rule. 
The British refer to an ICU phenomenon known as “bed­
blockers.” These are patients who have inordinately long 
ICU stays, measurable in weeks or months.12 This is a very 
challenging ethical issue for them, since they have less 
than half the ICU beds we have in the United States on a 
population-adjusted basis. Most of the time, the fact that 
a patient will be a bed-blocker is not something that can 
be known with confidence at the time of admission. But 
at other times this might be something that is known with 
confidence. Should such knowledge sometimes generate 
an exception or limitation to the first-come first-served? 
Scenario A: Imagine that the ICU director knows at 
admission that a patient will need a bed for at least two 
months with a 40/60 chance of surviving that ICU stay. We 
might further imagine that this patient is 40 or 60 or 80 
years old. We might also imagine that this patient has some 
additional incurable disease such that he has a maximum 
life expectancy of four years under ideal conditions. At the 
moment this is the last bed in a fifteen-bed ICU. Turnover 
in the ICU has typically averaged two patients per day for 
the past two years. But there are three other patients in the 
ICU who have been there almost a month whose prognosis 
is very uncertain, meaning that no one would be surprised 
if they were to die in the ICU. Now one thing that is clear 
from this description is that this patient right now will 
satisfy the threshold criteria of the Thoracic Society. That 
is, this patient has a clearly medically justified need for ICU 
care and he is likely to derive sufficient benefit from ICU 
care. But the reader will recall that the Thoracic Society also 
endorsed the principle that the duty of providers to benefit 
patients “has limits when doing so unfairly compromises 
the availability of resources needed by others.” Might this 
be one of those situations where this latter point needs to 
be considered? 
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It might be the case that the description given so far is 
not ethically compelling enough such that we would 
consider overriding the first-come first served principle 
in this situation. But we could add other detail that would 
increase the ethical pressure on maintaining the first-come 
first-served rule. We could imagine that half the beds in the 
ICU were occupied by patients who had been there already 
for a month or longer. We could imagine that this reduced 
turnover to only about one patient per day, and that it was 
common that once per week three or four patients were 
going to need admission to the ICU whose prognosis was 
generally much more positive. Again, I want the reader to 
imagine that none of the patients in the variants of this 
scenario are violating the threshold constraints that either 
justified their admission to the ICU or their continued stay 
in the ICU. Some might be somewhat closer to violating a 
threshold constraint by virtue of the fact that they are more 
likely not to survive this ICU stay, though no one could 
confidently say that there was greater than 90 percent 
likelihood that this would be true. 
Scenario B: Imagine that as in scenario A a patient is about 
to be admitted to the ICU. That is, they have a 40/60 chance 
of surviving this ICU stay, though it is anticipated that by 
Day 5 it will be very clear that they either will or will not 
survive this stay. But then there is a reversal of medical 
fortune for this patient, and it is clear that they will need that 
ICU bed for at least two months with still a 40/60 chance of 
survival. Does it matter, ethically speaking, that this patient 
was already admitted to the ICU when it became clear that 
he was going to become a bed-blocker for two months? 
Does the fact that there is this initial clear commitment to 
the patient (admitting him to the ICU) mean there is now 
a clear moral obligation to give him a right to that bed for 
two months, at least as long as he does not violate the 
threshold conditions for continuing to have a right to that 
bed? This is the sort of argument that is often made in re-
transplantation cases.13 
To illustrate, a patient is given a liver transplant that is 
saving his life, but the liver is a little less than perfect (and 
the patient knew that when he accepted the liver), and it 
is now failing after only six months. Does this patient then 
have a just claim to be at the top of the transplant list (first­
come first-served), even though the clear implication of 
providing a second liver to this patient is that some other 
patient will be condemned to death who otherwise would 
have gotten that organ? I have argued that such a patient 
does not have a right to go to the top of the transplant list. 
Part of the reason for that conclusion is that someone else 
is being denied any chance for additional survival while this 
patient will have had two chances. Also, second transplants 
generally do not do so well in terms of overall survival as 
first transplants. The mere fact that the transplant surgeon 
has obligations of fidelity to the best interests of that 
patient is not sufficient to justify claiming a second liver 
for him. 
Likewise, as with re-transplantation, if we tighten up the 
empirical constraints in our Scenario B so that patients 
now outside the ICU are denied admission because of 
accumulating bed-blockers at some potential risk to their 
lives, then it might be the case that our first-come first-
served rule ought to be overridden. More specifically, we 
might imagine that all the bed-blockers in the ICU were 
clustered relatively closely to one another in terms of their 
prospects for survival. Their prospects might still be in 
the 40/60 or 30/70 range. In other words we would have 
no good enough reason for dismissing any of them from 
the ICU in order to admit others who might have a more 
urgent need and better prospects. On the other hand, if 
there were a couple of these patients who were close to 
one of the thresholds (but not in clear violation of one of 
the thresholds), and if we did have the less-than-perfect 
prognostic tools mentioned above as a basis for confirming 
“closeness” to a threshold, then maybe that would provide 
a “just enough” basis for removing such individuals from 
the ICU in order to allow the admission of other patients 
with clearly superior prospects of benefit from the ICU. The 
reader will notice that I am not asserting this conclusion 
with a high degree of moral confidence. This is reasonable 
because it is far from clear that a high degree of confidence 
is warranted. It might be the case that we could have an 
ICU policy that would tilt in either direction and be “just 
enough.” What might be necessary and morally appropriate 
would be to engage the broader community in a process 
of rational democratic deliberation. What policy would 
they (as mostly perfectly healthy individuals at present) 
want to see adopted when they or their loved ones would 
have future ICU needs and they might either be one of the 
bed-blockers or a patient on the outside urgently needing 
access to that ICU bed and having better prospects than 
some patients already in the ICU? Such choices could be 
made legitimately and justly by our healthy deliberators 
because they would in fact be behind a practical (real) veil 
of ignorance and they would be making these choices for 
their future possible selves. They would not be imposing 
these choices on undefended others.14 
Scenario C: Patient is admitted to the ICU with a 40/60 
chance of survival, and an anticipated stay of two months. 
But after two months have elapsed, the condition of the 
patient has deteriorated to some degree. What is believed 
now is that this patient is likely to need an additional 
two months in the ICU with a predicted 20/80 chance of 
survival. Again, the patient remains within the threshold 
limits that the Thoracic Society has in mind for continuation 
in the ICU, though, if we increase the ethical pressure again 
so that the availability of life-saving resources for others 
might be significantly compromised, it seems that more 
consideration ought to be given to dismissing this patient 
from the ICU despite a commitment to the first-come first-
served rule. We might add one other twist to this scenario, 
which must be a common enough circumstance in an ICU. 
Specifically, what is the ethically right thing to do if a patient 
does violate one of the threshold limits? That is, a patient 
takes a turn for the worse such that a skillful clinician would 
judge at that point in time that this patient had less than 
a 10 percent chance of surviving this ICU stay. For how 
many days should a patient be allowed to remain in the ICU 
having violated this threshold for remaining there, given 
that he might improve a bit and once again be within the 
threshold? The main conclusion I would draw at this point 
is that it is not ethically obvious that the first-come first-
served rule is the right rule to affirm in these more complex 
circumstances, all things considered. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
What is ethically compelling about the first-come first-
served rule is that patients in the ICU should have something 
more than a tentative commitment to that ICU bed and the 
necessary care that they require. That is, they should not 
have to wonder constantly whether some patient will come 
along who might have somewhat better prospects than 
them if they instead were given that ICU bed. Having said 
that, we need to add that the first-come first-served rule 
needs constraints or qualifications in at least some clinical 
circumstances (though I have made no effort in this essay 
to identify what all those circumstances might be). Patients 
do not have an unlimited right to an ICU bed merely 
because they arrived first, or because they have remained 
within the threshold considerations for admittance or 
maintenance in the ICU. The ICU is a social resource. 
Relevant considerations of justice should determine who 
has a sufficiently just claim to that resource. If individual use 
of an ICU bed threatens the equal just claims of others to 
an ICU bed, as with some bed-blockers in some situations, 
then considerations of justice other than first-come first-
served may justify removing a patient from the ICU. If 
such considerations that would override the first-come 
first-served rule can be clearly articulated and legitimated 
through a fair and honest democratic deliberative process, 
then that would strengthen the justness of such a practice 
regarding ICU rationing. 
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